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Researchers disclosed critical weaknesses in Salesforce Marketing Cloud (formerly ExactTarget) that could have allowed cross-tenant exposure of subscriber data, sent emails, SMS records, click tracking, and other marketing data. AMPScript and SSJS template-injection paths could query unrestricted Data Views, while legacy encrypted query strings used by email-view, Cloud Pages, and Forward-to-a-Friend features were vulnerable to CBC padding-oracle and obsolete XOR-based cryptographic attacks, enabling parameter decryption and forgery. Salesforce replaced the affected protection with AES-GCM, expired links generated before January 23, 2026, and disabled double evaluation of AMPScript in email subject lines; it said it found no confirmed unauthorized access or misuse tied to the issues.
Separate research documented how an exposed Uber testing endpoint for Salesforce ExactTarget previously let authenticated users submit arbitrary AMPScript through a preview function. The flaw permitted queries against Uber’s driver_partners data extension, returning driver UUIDs, join dates, email addresses, and first names, and allowed outbound HTTP GET requests through ExactTarget infrastructure. Assetnote reported that issue in November 2017, Uber remediated it within two days, and the report earned a total HackerOne bounty of $23,000.
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Salesforce completed remediation by deploying AES-GCM encryption, expiring links generated before January 23 at 21:00 UTC, and disabling double evaluation of AMPScript in email subject lines. Salesforce assigned CVE-2026-22585, CVE-2026-22586, CVE-2026-22582, CVE-2026-22583, and CVE-2026-2298, and stated it had not identified confirmed related customer-data misuse.
Researchers reported template-injection, encrypted query-string, and AMPScript double-evaluation weaknesses in Salesforce Marketing Cloud. The flaws could have allowed cross-tenant access to subscriber, email, SMS, and click-tracking data, as well as decryption or forgery of legacy email-view parameters.
Uber remediated the reported AMPScript-evaluation vulnerability. Uber and HackerOne ultimately paid a total $23,000 bounty for the report, including a $20,000 Hack the World bonus.
Assetnote reported that Uber's exposed exacttarget-web-hook.uber.com testing interface evaluated arbitrary Salesforce Marketing Cloud AMPScript for authenticated users. The issue enabled queries of the driver_partners data extension and outbound HTTP GET requests via ExactTarget infrastructure.
Salesforce acquired ExactTarget, the developer of AMPScript, in 2013.
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Searchlight Cyber disclosed multiple patched vulnerabilities in **Salesforce Marketing Cloud (SFMC)** that could have exposed private email data across hundreds of organizations on Salesforce’s shared infrastructure. The issues affected **AMPScript**, **SSJS**, **CloudPages**, email rendering, and legacy tracking and email-view links, creating paths for template injection, subscriber enumeration, access to internal data views, and forged or decrypted tracking parameters. Researchers said one key flaw came from double evaluation of AMPScript in email subject lines, allowing unsanitized subscriber input to be executed during rendering, while another involved argument injection through the `MicrositeURL` function. Researchers also found weak protections on legacy links, including a static XOR-based scheme and unauthenticated CBC encryption that could act as a padding oracle, enabling decryption and forgery of links and raising the risk of **cross-tenant** access to sent email content, contact lists, SMS records, and click-tracking data. Salesforce said the flaws were reported on **16 January 2026** and mitigated between **21 and 24 January**, including disabling subject-line double evaluation, migrating Marketing Cloud Engagement encryption to **AES-GCM**, rotating keys, and invalidating older tracking, CloudPages, and email-view links created before **21 January 2026 23:00 UTC**; the company said it found no confirmed unauthorized customer data access or malicious exploitation.
Jun 29, 2026
Zenity Labs disclosed three now-patched **SalesBleed** vulnerabilities in Salesforce Agentforce that allowed attackers to plant indirect prompt injections through public Salesforce Web-to-Lead forms. When an employee later asked Agentforce about a seemingly legitimate lead, hidden instructions in the poisoned record could direct the General CRM subagent to retrieve other CRM records available under its existing permissions, without requiring the employee to click or approve an action. The researchers demonstrated exfiltration through DNS requests initiated by externally sourced HTML image URLs after bypassing Agentforce's Trusted URLs redaction safeguards; Slack link unfurling also contributed to the data-leak chain. A separate flaw in Slack-thread replies enabled Agentforce to send messages without confirmation or visible attribution, allowing anonymous phishing as the trusted agent. Salesforce remediated the reported issues, with Zenity confirming the final fixes on September 21.
Sep 25, 2026
Threat actors have exploited overly permissive anonymous-user settings in publicly accessible **Salesforce Experience Cloud** environments to retrieve data through the `/s/sfsites/aura` endpoint. A modified version of the open-source Aura Inspector tool has been used to mass-scan sites and extract records where guest permissions permit access; exposed names and phone numbers can support subsequent phishing and vishing. Salesforce says the platform is not itself vulnerable—the exposure results from customer configuration—and Dutch authorities reported that these campaigns affected misconfigured environments from late 2025 into early 2026. Researchers also identified multiple **Mendix** low-code applications with excessive rights assigned to anonymous or newly registered users. Automated scans and legitimate platform requests can collect sensitive data from such deployments, potentially enabling extortion; McGraw-Hill was cited publicly as an example in April 2026. Organizations should inventory internet-facing applications and access rights, enforce least privilege and private defaults, remove unnecessary anonymous access and self-registration, require MFA for administrators, and centralize logging and behavior-based detection for abnormal API activity.
Aug 31, 2026