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NetSPI reported that Azure's built-in Anyscale Platform Administrator role granted unconstrained Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write and Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete permissions. A principal assigned that role could create role assignments for itself or others, including the highly privileged Owner role, creating a subscription-level privilege-escalation path that conventional role-centric reviews could overlook.
Microsoft Security Response Center confirmed the finding reported on June 8, 2026, and removed the dangerous role-assignment permissions from the built-in role by June 22. The researchers also warned that a Microsoft-recommended ABAC condition intended to constrain Owner or User Access Administrator assignment can be bypassed by identities able to modify role definitions and create an unconstrained custom role; Azure administrators should review effective RBAC and ABAC permissions, restrict assignment scope, segment subscriptions, and enforce least privilege for built-in as well as custom roles.
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MSRC marked the researchers' report as a duplicate and completed the case; the dangerous permissions had been removed by this point.
Microsoft remediated the built-in Anyscale Platform Administrator Role by removing Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write and Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/delete. The remediated role definition showed an updated timestamp of June 17, 2026.
Microsoft Security Response Center confirmed the reported privilege-escalation behavior in the Anyscale Platform Administrator Role.
Researchers submitted an MSRC report that the built-in Anyscale Platform Administrator Role had unconstrained Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write and /delete permissions, allowing holders to assign privileged roles such as Owner.
Researchers reported that constrained Owner or User Access Administrator access combined with role-definition write permission could create and self-assign an unconstrained custom role. MSRC closed the report as Complete and by design.
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Microsoft disclosed **CVE-2026-58275**, a critical missing-authorization flaw in **Azure DNS** that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to elevate privileges over the network. The vulnerability carries a **CVSS 3.1 score of 10.0** with vector `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H` and is mapped to **CWE-862**. Because Azure DNS is a hosted cloud control-plane service, successful exploitation could have enabled unauthorized changes to DNS records, traffic redirection, service disruption, and manipulation of email routing. Microsoft said the issue was remediated with a **service-side fix** through the Microsoft Security Update Guide, and no active exploitation had been reported at the time of disclosure. Defenders were urged to review **Azure RBAC** permissions, audit recent DNS changes, enforce privileged identity protections, and enable logging and alerting for suspicious DNS modifications and role-assignment activity.
Jul 24, 2026
Research has shown that Azure Storage account read and write permissions can be abused to gain broader access in cloud environments, turning what appears to be limited storage access into a path for **privilege escalation** and **lateral movement**. The findings are significant because Azure Storage accounts are widely used across organizations for blobs, files, queues, and tables, and Microsoft recommends **general-purpose v2** accounts as the standard deployment model for most workloads. Microsoft documentation underscores how central these accounts are to Azure operations, noting built-in encryption at rest, multiple redundancy options, fixed account-type choices after creation, and endpoint behaviors that administrators must manage carefully. Together, the research and platform guidance indicate that mis-scoped permissions on storage accounts can create outsized security risk, making least-privilege access, careful role assignment, and review of legacy or migrated storage configurations critical for defenders.
Aug 9, 2026
Microsoft fixed a privilege escalation flaw in **Entra ID** that allowed users with the built-in **Agent ID Administrator** role to take over arbitrary service principals, including identities unrelated to AI agents. Silverfort reported that the role could assign ownership over a target service principal, add new credentials, and then authenticate as that principal, effectively enabling full service principal takeover. The weakness stemmed from a scoping gap in Microsoft’s Agent Identity Platform, where a role intended to manage agent-related objects could also affect standard directory components. The exposure was especially serious in tenants with highly privileged service principals, where attackers could inherit sensitive API access, integrations, or directory-level roles and potentially reach **Global Administrator-equivalent** power. Silverfort said the abuse path was broadly relevant because most customer tenants it analyzed had at least one privileged service principal, while ownership changes could blend in with normal administrative activity and evade detection. Microsoft addressed the issue with a backend fix that restricted the **Agent ID Administrator** role to agent-related objects and said the remediation was fully rolled out by April 9.
Jun 29, 2026