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Elastic Security Labs identified an active ClickFix campaign that compromises legitimate websites, including bincheck.io and investonline.in, to display multilingual fake Cloudflare verification prompts. The lure copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to a visitor’s clipboard and relies on the victim manually executing it, initiating a five-stage infection chain that delivers the custom native C++ remote-access trojan MIMICRAT.
The PowerShell stages use runtime obfuscation and attempt to disable Windows Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logging and AMSI scanning before a Lua-based loader decrypts and runs shellcode in memory. MIMICRAT uses malleable HTTPS command-and-control and enables file and process operations, token theft and impersonation, shellcode injection, interactive shells, and SOCKS5 tunneling; the campaign remained active when reported.
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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Elastic Security Labs publicly released initial indicators for the MIMICRAT ClickFix campaign.
Elastic Security Labs identified an active campaign using compromised legitimate websites and a multilingual fake Cloudflare ClickFix lure to deliver a five-stage chain ending in MIMICRAT. Endpoint telemetry showed suspicious obfuscated PowerShell execution; reported targets included a US university and Chinese-speaking users.
MIMICRAT compilation metadata indicates the custom native x64 C++ remote-access trojan was compiled with Microsoft Visual Studio linker version 14.44.
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An active malware campaign is using **ClickFix** fake CAPTCHA pages to trick users into pasting and running malicious PowerShell commands. The infection chain deploys GHOSTPULSE—also known as **HijackLoader** or IDATLOADER—using DLL sideloading, followed by a .NET intermediary that decrypts and reflectively loads the ARECHCLIENT2/SectopRAT remote-access trojan directly into memory. The deceptive CAPTCHA pages were hosted on client subdomains of `dealeronlinemarketing.com` and `contology.com`, which researchers assess were likely enabled by the compromise of server `50.57.243[.]90`. ARECHCLIENT2 bypasses AMSI, profiles infected systems, steals credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency-wallet information, and receives commands from rotating command-and-control infrastructure. SectopRAT is a .NET-based RAT with a history of anti-analysis protections, including ConfuserEx control-flow obfuscation and anti-tamper measures; its deployment through reflective loading further reduces disk-based detection opportunities. Organizations should prioritize user awareness of fake CAPTCHA copy-and-paste prompts and detect anomalous PowerShell execution, DLL sideloading, and in-memory .NET loading behavior.
Sep 9, 2026
Researchers reported multiple **ClickFix** campaigns using fake CAPTCHA or reCAPTCHA prompts to trick users into manually running malicious commands, with payloads tailored by platform and victim profile. On Windows, one campaign delivered a modular NodeJS-based RAT and infostealer through a malicious MSI installer, loading key capabilities only in memory after command-and-control was established and using `gRPC` over Tor for persistent communications. An operational security failure exposed the malware’s backend protocol definitions and admin panel API, revealing a malware-as-a-service operation with multi-operator support, Telegram alerts, automation rules, and cryptocurrency wallet tracking. The malware also fingerprinted victims extensively and established persistence through the Windows Run registry key as **LogicOptimizer**. A separate ClickFix chain attributed with high confidence to **Grandoreiro** targeted users of eight Brazilian banks by luring victims through a fake reCAPTCHA page and launching a malicious PowerShell sequence that sideloaded a Delphi banking trojan with legitimate GoToMeeting and Nero binaries. The malware deployed banking overlays, intercepted **PIX** QR-code payments, added Microsoft Defender exclusions, and stole credentials, device information, signatures, and payment confirmation codes. Netskope also documented a macOS variant that used AppleScript and a persistent fake password dialog to harvest Keychain data, browser cookies, saved credentials, extension storage, and cryptocurrency wallet data; the theft of live session cookies can enable attackers to bypass MFA by hijacking authenticated sessions.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple active campaigns using **ClickFix** social engineering—fake error dialogs or verification prompts that trick users into manually running attacker-supplied commands—to bypass browser and download protections and establish an initial foothold. In one enterprise case investigated by **CERT Polska (cert.pl)**, victims were lured via compromised websites showing a fake CAPTCHA/“fix” prompt that instructed them to paste and run a **PowerShell** command via `Win+R`; the script then downloaded a dropper and enabled rapid follow-on activity that can scale to **enterprise-wide compromise**, including deployment of secondary malware such as **Latrodectus** and **Supper** for data theft, lateral movement, and potential ransomware staging. A separate ClickFix operation targeted **macOS developers** by cloning the *Homebrew* site on typosquatted infrastructure; the “install” command was subtly altered to fetch content from `raw.homabrews.org` instead of `raw.githubusercontent.com`, leading to **Cuckoo Stealer** deployment and credential harvesting via repeated password prompts using macOS Directory Services, with related domains tied to shared hosting at **`5.255.123.244`**. ClickFix was also observed as the initial execution mechanism for the resurfaced **Matanbuchus 3.0** MaaS loader, which uses deceptive copy/paste prompts and **silent MSI** execution (via `msiexec`) to deliver a new payload, **AstarionRAT**, enabling capabilities including credential theft and **SOCKS5** proxying; operators were reported to move laterally quickly (including toward domain controllers), consistent with ransomware or data-exfiltration objectives.
Jul 2, 2026