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Qbot Banking Trojan Uses regsvr32, SYSTEM Tasks, and Defender Exclusions

Attack Tradecraft · 3 sources · Updated 2mo ago · First seen Nov 28, 2020

Qbot Banking Trojan Uses regsvr32, SYSTEM Tasks, and Defender Exclusions

Elastic Security Labs documented Qbot/QakBot (also known as QBOT), a long-running modular Windows banking trojan used by multiple threat actors and ransomware affiliates. In the analyzed activity, the malware executed as a DLL through the legitimate Windows regsvr32.exe utility, used cmd.exe and curl.exe, injected into explorer.exe, copied itself into a randomly named directory beneath the user AppData path, and established persistence through Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks intended to run with SYSTEM privileges.

Qbot used anti-analysis and defense-evasion checks to identify sandbox, monitoring, and security products, and could add its persistence location to Microsoft Defender exclusions when Defender was present. It avoided execution on systems configured for Russian and several Eastern European, Central Asian, and Caucasus-region languages. The malware communicated with a distributed C2 network over HTTP or TLS using encrypted, Base64-encoded JSON, enabling operators to deliver updates, execute shell or PowerShell commands, and inject or launch additional binaries; Elastic identified 138 associated IP addresses and linked the infrastructure to hundreds of malicious files.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

6 events · 2007 – 2022
  1. Reported Aug 22, 20224y ago

    Elastic identifies QBOT command-and-control infrastructure

    Dynamic and static analysis identified 138 QBOT-associated IP addresses, which Elastic linked to 339 additional malicious files. The associated samples included predominantly QBOT Win32 DLLs, EMOTET-associated executables, and malicious-spam Office attachments.

    Exploring the QBOT Attack Pattern
  2. Reported Aug 22, 20224y ago

    REF3726 QBOT establishes persistence and SYSTEM execution

    The analyzed QBOT sample injected into explorer.exe, copied itself into the user's AppData directory, created Registry Run-key persistence, and created a scheduled task to run regsvr32.exe as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

    Exploring the QBOT Attack Pattern
  3. Reported Aug 22, 20224y ago

    Elastic observes and analyzes REF3726 QBOT infection chain

    Elastic tracked REF3726 activity in which an initial cmd.exe chain tested connectivity, created C:\vyr, used curl.exe to download a disguised payload, and executed it with regsvr32.exe. Elastic Endpoint Security blocked the initial infection, after which researchers manually detonated the QBOT DLL for analysis.

    Exploring the QBOT Attack Pattern
  4. 2022

    QBOT V4 campaign deploys multi-stage malware

    A 2022 QBOT V4 campaign used a multi-stage Windows DLL launched through regsvr32, process injection, Registry and filesystem persistence, SYSTEM-level scheduled-task execution, and encrypted HTTP/TLS command-and-control.

    QBOT Malware Analysis
  5. Nov 28, 20206y ago

    QBOT appears in Elastic's dataset amid shared-infrastructure shift

    Elastic first observed QBOT in its dataset on November 28, 2020. It reported that shared infrastructure use shifted beginning that month, with QBOT DLLs comprising 97.1% of samples first seen after November 2020.

    Exploring the QBOT Attack Pattern
  6. 2007

    QBOT banking trojan becomes active

    QBOT, also known as QAKBOT, began operating as a modular banking trojan and was later adopted broadly by threat actors and ransomware groups.

    QBOT Malware Analysis
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24 linked

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