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Huntress investigated two late-August phishing intrusions in which attackers used browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) pages impersonating Adobe Acrobat or Reader to convince victims to install unauthorized ScreenConnect remote-management clients. Victims were led through malicious links and fake CAPTCHA or PDF-viewer lures to counterfeit Adobe browser windows that displayed the legitimate-looking get.adobe.com address within page content.
In each incident, the initial ScreenConnect installation downloaded and installed a second rogue ScreenConnect client, providing redundant service-based persistence and remote-access channels. The attackers also ran HideCursor.exe or HideUL.exe to conceal interactive activity; Huntress contained both intrusions before additional compromise. Microsoft Defender detected a command associated with patch.msi in one case but did not stop deployment of the second ScreenConnect client.
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2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On August 31, a victim interacted with a phishing message delivered through AT&T Office@Hand that led to the same fake Adobe Reader browser-in-the-browser template. An Adobe-update-themed installer deployed a ScreenConnect client, which retrieved a second client; both were registered as Windows services, and the actor ran HideUL.exe after deployment.
On August 25, Huntress detected malicious activity after a Gmail user followed a phishing link through fake CAPTCHA and Adobe PDF Reader browser-in-the-browser pages. The victim installed a rogue ScreenConnect client that downloaded a second client, established redundant service-based persistence, and was used to run HideCursor.exe.
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Huntress identified a campaign in which attackers use social engineering—including fake technical support, phishing, fraudulent refund-search results, and Quick Assist abuse—to persuade victims to install trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect clients. Rather than exploiting a ScreenConnect vulnerability, the altered remote-support software detects incoming sessions and uses ScreenConnect file-transfer and remote-execution functions to send a staged four-part VBScript loader to the connecting endpoint, potentially infecting technician and help-desk systems without further user interaction. The payload chain profiles hosts, establishes persistence, seeks elevated execution, and can deploy remote-access, tunneling, and cryptocurrency-mining tools while attempting to evade security controls, including Microsoft Defender reporting and User Account Control. Huntress observed the activity at unrelated organizations during late-August incidents and advises organizations to reimage confirmed compromised systems, review ScreenConnect deployments and audit logs, and investigate suspicious Windows Script Host or PowerShell execution linked to ScreenConnect sessions.
Sep 8, 2026
Researchers reported an active **Smoke#Screen** social-engineering campaign that tricks victims into installing the legitimate, ConnectWise-signed **ScreenConnect** remote monitoring and management tool, giving attackers persistent remote access while blending in with normal IT activity. The operation targets both **Windows** and **macOS** users and uses multiple lures, including fake **Zoom** and **Adobe** updates, document-review requests, and a **SystemCheck** maintenance tool. Securonix linked the activity to a live staging server at `207.174.0.143:8080`, reconstructed five kill chains, and tied the campaign to three attacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay clusters. The attackers rotated payloads between download sessions and used a mix of **VBScript droppers**, batch loaders, compiled **.NET** executables, phishing HTML pages, **Dropbox** links, **Cloudflare Quick Tunnels**, encrypted bundles, and a **WsgiDAV** staging server to frustrate hash-, signature-, and reputation-based detection. Researchers said the tradecraft evolved from obfuscated, sandbox-aware droppers to loaders that disabled Microsoft Defender and later to stealthier variants that delayed execution to evade Elastic correlation, underscoring that **behavioral detection** is more effective than relying on software trust or static indicators alone.
Aug 7, 2026
Threat actors abused the legitimate **Faronics Deploy** cloud endpoint-management platform to enroll victim devices into attacker-controlled deployments, execute remote PowerShell scripts, and install **ConnectWise ScreenConnect** for persistent interactive remote access. From July 21 to August 20, the campaign exposed more than 457 endpoints through invoice, tax-document, and business-file phishing lures. Victims were directed to cloaked, fingerprinting-enabled phishing pages and persuaded to run signed Faronics installers masquerading as Adobe software, documents, or updates. The attackers used Faronics Deploy to retrieve follow-on tooling and establish a ScreenConnect channel independent of the abused management platform. Faronics was notified on August 5, implemented anti-abuse controls, and contacted potentially affected organizations; observed activity dropped substantially after August 21. Organizations should investigate unexpected ScreenConnect installations, review `Faronics ScriptRunner.log` for remotely supplied script URLs, and use Faronics configuration-request `ck` deployment identifiers to identify systems enrolled in malicious deployments.
Sep 5, 2026