Loading story…
Air Force Secretary Troy Meink publicly confirmed that the U.S. Space Force has deployed space-control weapons in orbit, marking the Pentagon’s first acknowledgement that the United States possesses space-based weapons. Speaking at the Air, Space and Cyber Conference, Meink said the systems are intended to defend joint forces against hostile adversary actions, but did not disclose their type, number, locations, or operational capabilities.
The Space Force’s warfighting framework contemplates kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace missions, including orbital strike, asset escort, space-link interdiction, counterattacks, and suppression of adversary targeting. Non-kinetic options can employ electromagnetic or cyber effects; the service also accepted the ground-based, mobile Meadowlands satellite jammer for operations in June. Analysts generally favor jamming, spoofing, and laser-dazzling capabilities over destructive anti-satellite attacks, which create persistent orbital debris, as China and Russia continue to pursue a broad range of counterspace weapons.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Gen. Chance Saltzman said other countries, presumed to include China and Russia, were pursuing all six counterspace weapon categories, while the United States was not yet pursuing all of them. He said the United States could have valid reasons to possess capabilities across all categories.
The U.S. Space Force began openly discussing its ability to conduct warfare in the space domain.
Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink announced that the U.S. Space Force has deployed space-control weapons in orbit to defend the joint force from hostile adversary actions. The statement was described as the first public confirmation by a Pentagon official that the United States possesses space-based weapons; Meink did not identify their type, number, or capabilities.
The U.S. Space Force announced operational acceptance of Meadowlands, a ground-based mobile satellite jammer.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
See this adversary's TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history, correlated against your exposure.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Senior U.S. intelligence officials have warned that as space becomes an active domain of warfare, cyberattacks are likely to be the first form of aggression, particularly targeting ground stations that control satellites. Johnathon Martin, acting deputy director at the National Reconnaissance Office, emphasized that cyber operations are favored over physical attacks due to the risk of uncontrollable escalation, such as the Kessler effect, which could result from debris-generating collisions in space. He advised satellite operators that compromise of ground stations could lead to full control over satellites by adversaries, making these facilities a critical vulnerability in any future conflict involving space assets. The warnings were delivered during a keynote at the annual CyberSat conference, where officials and industry leaders from multiple countries discussed the increasing importance of cybersecurity for space infrastructure. The consensus is that private sector companies operating in the space domain are on the front lines, and that robust cyber defenses for ground stations are essential to prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives with minimal escalation. The evolving threat landscape underscores the need for heightened vigilance and investment in cybersecurity measures for both government and commercial space operations.
Jun 29, 2026
U.S. military leaders said small unmanned aircraft are increasingly threatening both domestic installations and overseas operations, prompting a broader push to improve counter-drone defenses. Gen. Gregory Guillot told lawmakers that **350 drone detections** were reported over the past year across **100 U.S. military installations**, with the primary concern being surveillance of sensitive capabilities by known and unknown actors. He said existing authorities under `Title 10, Section 130i` are too narrow because only about half of installations are covered and commanders often cannot act against drones flying just outside base perimeters. NORTHCOM and NORAD have since established a dedicated counter-drone operations branch, and the Pentagon designated NORTHCOM as the lead coordinator for counter-small UAS efforts in the continental United States and Alaska. At the same time, the Pentagon is continuing to send counter-UAS systems to the Middle East through **Joint Interagency Task Force 401** as regional tensions and an unstable ceasefire sustain demand for air defense. JIATF-401 said it committed more than **$600 million** in counter-drone defenses for Operation Epic Fury and domestic missions, including about **$350 million** in roughly 30 days for CENTCOM. Officials and outside experts said the threat now spans Iran-backed drone activity, lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, unauthorized flights over bases such as **Barksdale Air Force Base**, southern border operations, and security planning for major events including the **2026 FIFA World Cup**. The Defense Department is also testing commercially available systems through Falcon Peak exercises to detect, track, identify, and defeat low-emission and no-emission drones.
Jun 29, 2026
The UK Ministry of Defence is advancing legal changes in the *Armed Forces Bill* to give British defence personnel explicit authority to neutralize drones and other unmanned platforms deemed threatening near military bases and operations, a power currently more constrained and typically exercised by police and select agencies. The MoD cited a sharp rise in reported unmanned aerial intrusions near sensitive UK sites (266 in 2025 vs. 126 in 2024) and indicated the practical response will often rely on **electronic countermeasures** (e.g., RF jamming) rather than small-arms fire; recent examples and demonstrations referenced include RF jamming incidents and UK testing of **directed-energy** counter-drone systems (high-energy RF and laser-based capabilities). Separately, the U.S. Marine Corps’ 2nd Maintenance Battalion announced an **NDAA-compliant** modular drone, **HANX**, designed to avoid China-sourced parts and to be rapidly manufactured and repaired using **3D-printed components** in-house. The stated intent is to shorten procurement and sustainment timelines by reducing reliance on external contractors while enabling quick reconfiguration for missions ranging from reconnaissance to “one-way attack” roles, reflecting a broader push toward more secure, domestically supportable unmanned systems within U.S. defense organizations.
Jun 29, 2026