Loading story…
CrowdSec disclosed that a backdoored TanStack dependency was used in May to extract an API key with read access to its private repositories, resulting in the unauthorized copying of source code from roughly 300 repositories. The exposed material included code for its SaaS console, AWS Cloud routines, connectors, and automations; more than 130 affected repositories containing the open-source CrowdSec Security Engine were already public.
The company was notified of the incident on September 16 and said it found no evidence that customer data, customer logs, or credentials enabling lateral movement were compromised. CrowdSec rotated affected API tokens and other credentials, increased monitoring, and began reviewing its code and systems for potential backdoors linked to the supply-chain compromise.
Trace attribution and downstream blast radius.
3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On September 17, 2026, CrowdSec publicly disclosed the incident, saying exposed private code included SaaS console, AWS Cloud, connector, and automation code. It stated that no customer data or logs were compromised, rotated affected tokens and credentials, and increased monitoring and backdoor investigations.
CrowdSec was notified of the source-code exposure on September 16, 2026, and its internal teams confirmed the incident.
In May 2026, a backdoored TanStack dependency extracted an API key with read access to CrowdSec private repositories. Unauthorized actors copied source code from roughly 300 repositories during a short exploitation window.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
See attribution and downstream blast radius, and whether this package or vendor reaches your builds.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Attackers abused trusted open-source distribution channels to publish malicious package updates, including **84 tainted TanStack releases uploaded within six minutes** and a malicious payload discovered in the `Guardrails-AI` package on PyPI. The compromised packages were built to steal credentials from infected developer devices and move laterally to connected systems, highlighting how software supply-chain attacks can rapidly spread through widely used development dependencies. OpenAI confirmed that employee devices were affected by the TanStack incident, giving attackers **limited access** to a small number of internal code repositories. The company said there was **no evidence** that customer data, production systems, intellectual property, or software releases were compromised, and it reported no persistent threat in operational infrastructure. Researchers detected the malicious activity in about 20 minutes, likely constraining the blast radius, while OpenAI rotated cryptographic certificates associated with the affected repositories as part of containment.
Jun 29, 2026
Checkmarx said data stolen during its March supply chain intrusion has been published on the dark web, with investigators tracing the exposure to a corporate GitHub repository accessed during the initial attack. The company said the affected repository was part of its developer environment, not its customer production environment, and that current evidence indicates customer data was not stored there and remains unaffected. The disclosure follows reports that **LAPSUS$** listed Checkmarx on its leak site and claimed to possess source code, an employee database, API keys, and `MongoDB` and `MySQL` credentials. Checkmarx said it has locked down access to the repository and is continuing forensic analysis to determine exactly what source code or internal documentation was exfiltrated, while warning that the incident is part of a broader supply chain attack chain that also involved tampered GitHub Actions workflows, Open VSX plugins, and other developer tooling tied to the earlier compromise.
Jun 29, 2026
Attackers compromised TanStack’s npm release pipeline and published 84 malicious versions across 42 `@tanstack/*` packages, an incident tracked as **CVE-2026-45321** with a CVSS score of 9.6. The intrusion chained a vulnerable GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow, cache poisoning across the fork-to-base trust boundary, and theft of an OIDC token from runner memory, allowing the adversary to push malware under a trusted identity. The poisoned releases carried valid **SLSA Build Level 3** provenance, showing that the builds originated from the legitimate pipeline even though that pipeline had been subverted. The malicious packages used npm lifecycle execution and injected components including a fake `@tanstack/setup` dependency and a payload file named `router_init.js` to exfiltrate secrets from CI/CD systems and developer machines. Reporting tied the activity to the **Shai-Hulud** malware family and described a two-stage payload that harvested credentials, scraped GitHub Actions runner memory, exfiltrated data through multiple channels, and attempted self-propagation with stolen maintainer tokens; related package abuse was also noted in ecosystems including `@opensearch-project/opensearch`, `@uipath/*`, and `@redhat-cloud-services`. Defenders were urged to treat any affected installation as a likely credential compromise and to hunt for signs such as unusual publication bursts, tarball differences, unexpected `github:` dependencies pinned to commit SHAs, and files present in published tarballs but absent from package allowlists.
Jul 10, 2026