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A demonstrated AWS laboratory attack chain showed that an unauthenticated API Gateway endpoint could invoke a Lambda function that passed a user-controlled query parameter to Python's eval(). The resulting code injection let an unauthenticated caller read temporary AWS credentials from the Lambda runtime environment; the credentials were associated with the vuln-lab-lambda-execution-role and could access a database-master secret in AWS Secrets Manager.
The demonstration highlights how an application-layer flaw can become a cloud credential compromise when Lambda execution roles are overprivileged. Permissions such as iam:PassRole combined with Lambda management rights could support account-level privilege escalation, while lambda:UpdateFunctionCode could permit persistence. Organizations should require API authentication, remove dynamic execution of untrusted input, restrict Lambda roles to least privilege, and monitor API Gateway and CloudWatch logs, CloudTrail, and GuardDuty for suspicious activity.
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A laboratory AWS environment demonstrated that an unauthenticated API Gateway endpoint could invoke vuln-lab-get-user-data, where a user-controlled query parameter reaches Python eval(). The code-injection flaw enabled retrieval of the Lambda execution role's temporary AWS credentials and access to the vuln-lab/database/master Secrets Manager secret containing appdb database credentials.
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AWS disclosed two severe vulnerabilities in **AWS Ops Wheel** that can let attackers seize administrative control of deployments and manipulate tenant data. **`CVE-2026-6911`** is an authentication bypass caused by missing JWT signature verification at the API Gateway endpoint, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge tokens and gain unintended admin access. AWS said successful exploitation could let attackers read, modify, and delete application data across tenants and manage Cognito user accounts in the deployment's User Pool; the flaw is tracked as **`CWE-347`** and carries a critical **CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`** rating. AWS also fixed **`CVE-2026-6912`**, a privilege-escalation issue in Ops Wheel's Cognito User Pool configuration that let authenticated users promote themselves to deployment administrator by setting the **`custom:deployment_admin`** attribute through the `UpdateUserAttributes` API. The bug, classified as **`CWE-915`**, exposed the same ability to manage Cognito user accounts and carried a high-severity **CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`** score. AWS directed customers to redeploy from the updated repository and apply the fixes to any forked or derivative code, with patches referenced in an AWS security bulletin, a GitHub pull request, and a GitHub security advisory.
Jun 29, 2026
Google warned that publicly accessible serverless applications, particularly Google Cloud Run services and functions, can expose organizations to **remote code execution**, secret theft, and deeper cloud compromise when custom code, third-party packages, or runtime components are vulnerable. The report highlighted two representative attack paths: a Python/Flask-style **local file inclusion** flaw and a **command injection** issue that can let an attacker execute arbitrary commands in an exposed function. After gaining execution, attackers may query the Google Cloud metadata service to retrieve **service account bearer tokens**, enabling lateral movement and broader access inside the cloud environment. Google said defensive measures should focus on hardening internet-facing functions and applying Cloud Armor protections, noting that WAF signatures such as `lfi-v33-stable` and `rce-v33-stable` blocked the demonstrated exploit requests with HTTP `403` responses.
Jul 16, 2026
AWS disclosed two critical vulnerabilities in **AWS Ops Wheel v2** that could let attackers seize full administrative control of customer deployments. **CVE-2026-6911** stems from missing cryptographic verification of JWT signatures in the v2 API, allowing an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the API Gateway endpoint to forge tokens with arbitrary tenant and administrator claims. The flaw could expose all application data across tenants and permit management of Amazon Cognito user accounts; it affects deployments built from **PR #147 through PR #163**, while v1 is not affected. GitHub advisory **`GHSA-v5vr-8w3c-37x2`** says the issue was fixed in **PR #164**, and temporary mitigations include restricting API Gateway access with **AWS WAF** or **VPC** controls. A second issue, **CVE-2026-6912**, allowed any authenticated user to escalate privileges by modifying self-writable security-sensitive Cognito attributes such as `custom:deployment_admin` through the Cognito `UpdateUserAttributes` API. An attacker could promote their own account to deployment administrator, then read, modify, or delete cross-tenant data and manage all users in the deployment’s Cognito User Pool. That flaw affects the same **PR #147-#163** range and was fixed in **PR #165** by tightening Cognito `WriteAttributes` and adding server-side email verification tied to `DEPLOYMENT_ADMIN_EMAILS`. Because Ops Wheel is deployed into customer AWS accounts through CloudFormation, each affected deployment and any forks or derivative code must be individually updated.
Jun 29, 2026