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Ransomware operators are using Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to load legitimately signed but flawed Windows kernel drivers, gain ring-0 access, and terminate security products protected by Protected Process Light (PPL). Reported examples include the WatchDog Antimalware v1.1.100 and eb kernel drivers, whose unauthenticated IOCTL interfaces can reportedly be abused to kill protected processes. Qilin's Killer Ultra and RansomHub's EDRKillShifter have used the technique through user-mode launchers that drop, load, and control vulnerable drivers.
Defenders should detect the sequence of suspicious driver drops, rapid driver installation or loading, low-prevalence driver hashes, and subsequent termination of endpoint-security processes. Organizations should inventory and baseline deployed drivers, enforce Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) driver policies, enable Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist and HVCI, maintain EDR tamper protection, and restrict administrative privileges to reduce exposure to known vulnerable drivers, including those catalogued by LOLDrivers.
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Criminal-market listings advertised EDR and antivirus killing tools claiming kernel-level operation and, in some cases, source-code availability. The listings appeared from December 2025 through February 2026.
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Researchers and incident responders reported continued abuse of **Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD)** techniques to disable endpoint protections, including **CrowdStrike Falcon**, by loading legitimately signed but flawed Windows kernel drivers. One newly analyzed zero-day driver family included more than 15 variants with valid Microsoft signatures and an IOCTL path such as `0x22E010` that accepted a process ID and invoked `ZwOpenProcess` and `ZwTerminateProcess` from kernel mode, allowing attackers to kill protected security processes without alerts. A proof-of-concept dubbed **PoisonKiller** demonstrated successful termination of the CrowdStrike EDR process through the driver’s symbolic link, underscoring the risk created by trusted but unrevoked third-party drivers. Separate reporting from Sophos and industry coverage tied the same broader tactic to real intrusions and ransomware activity, including ongoing abuse of **Terminator** and related tools built around vulnerable **Zemana** drivers. Attackers used IOCTL flaws to place their own processes on allow lists and then terminate AV and EDR components, while some incidents showed operators switching to alternatives such as **AuKill** when initial attempts failed. Defenders were urged to combine tamper protection, strict privilege controls, patching, and aggressive blocklisting of unnecessary vulnerable drivers, as signed-driver abuse has spread from advanced actors to commodity ransomware crews and lower-tier criminals.
Jun 30, 2026
**ESET Research** reported that **EDR killers** have become a standard component of modern ransomware operations, with attackers routinely disabling endpoint detection and response tools before launching encryptors. Across nearly 90 EDR killer tools observed in the wild, 54 were found to use the **Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD)** technique, abusing 34 signed but vulnerable drivers to obtain kernel-level privileges and tamper with security products. The research says this approach is especially attractive to ransomware affiliates because it creates a short, reliable window for encryption while avoiding the need to constantly rebuild encryptors to evade detection. The reporting also highlights how **ransomware-as-a-service** operations contribute to the diversity of EDR killer tooling: operators typically provide the encryptor and infrastructure, while affiliates choose the EDR-disabling utility used during an intrusion. Although BYOVD remains the dominant method because of its reliability and relatively low development cost, researchers also observed a growing set of tools that disable protections without loading drivers, including methods that disrupt EDR communications, suspend processes, or abuse built-in administrative utilities. The findings reinforce that vulnerable-driver abuse remains a key defensive gap, while non-kernel alternatives are also expanding the range of pre-encryption attack techniques defenders must monitor.
Jul 12, 2026
Multiple malware families have adopted advanced techniques to bypass endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions by leveraging Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks and stealthy driver installations. Notably, DeadLock ransomware has been observed exploiting a vulnerable Baidu driver to achieve kernel-level defense bypass, allowing it to disable security products and facilitate ransomware deployment. Similarly, Makop ransomware has evolved to incorporate GuLoader and BYOVD-based EDR killers, specifically targeting networks with exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services to gain initial access and evade detection. In parallel, the ValleyRAT malware family has demonstrated the use of stealthy driver installation methods to circumvent Windows 11 security protections. The public leak of the ValleyRAT builder has expanded its accessibility, enabling a broader range of threat actors to deploy this sophisticated backdoor. These developments highlight a growing trend among threat actors to exploit driver vulnerabilities and kernel-level techniques to undermine modern security controls across various malware campaigns.
Jun 29, 2026