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Predictable Session Cookie Secret Enabled Entra MFA Bypass and Account Impersonation

Vulnerability Disclosure · 3 sources · Updated 2mo ago · First seen Oct 1, 2026

Predictable Session Cookie Secret Enabled Entra MFA Bypass and Account Impersonation

An authorized assessment of an unnamed supply-chain yard management system uncovered a critical application-level authentication bypass in its custom signed-session-cookie design. The platform used publicly exposed user database identifiers (CUIDs) as identity-bearing cookie values and signed them with a predictable hard-coded HMAC secret reportedly matching the cookie name. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore forge valid sessions for arbitrary users, bypassing passwords, MFA, and Microsoft Entra ID SSO token validation; the weakness did not compromise Entra ID itself.

Researchers impersonated 95 of 241 tested employee accounts, including privileged administrators, and used a forged administrator session to execute persistent state-changing actions in a staging environment. The vulnerable session mechanism was accepted by both API and administrative single-page-application hosts, and an authenticated-user endpoint reportedly exposed an Entra refresh token. Recommended actions are to immediately rotate the signing secret, invalidate all active sessions, replace client-held identity claims with random server-side session IDs, use distinct high-entropy secrets per environment, and review logs for anomalous session use, impersonation, token exposure, and administrative activity.

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Event timeline

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1 event
  1. Reported Oct 1, 20262mo ago

    Assessment finds forgeable YMS session cookies enabling account impersonation

    An authorized assessment of an unnamed supply-chain yard management system found that a predictable hard-coded HMAC secret and client-held user CUIDs allowed unauthenticated forging of signed session cookies. Researchers impersonated 95 of 241 tested employee accounts, including administrators, and used a forged administrator session to perform a persistent state-changing API action in a staging environment; no production systems were tested.

    Resecurity | Session Cookie Authentication Bypass: Predictable Signing Secret Enableds Account Impersonations
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