Predictable Session Cookie Secret Enabled Entra MFA Bypass and Account Impersonation
Vulnerability Disclosure · 3 sources · Updated 2mo ago · First seen Oct 1, 2026

An authorized assessment of an unnamed supply-chain yard management system uncovered a critical application-level authentication bypass in its custom signed-session-cookie design. The platform used publicly exposed user database identifiers (CUIDs) as identity-bearing cookie values and signed them with a predictable hard-coded HMAC secret reportedly matching the cookie name. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore forge valid sessions for arbitrary users, bypassing passwords, MFA, and Microsoft Entra ID SSO token validation; the weakness did not compromise Entra ID itself.
Researchers impersonated 95 of 241 tested employee accounts, including privileged administrators, and used a forged administrator session to execute persistent state-changing actions in a staging environment. The vulnerable session mechanism was accepted by both API and administrative single-page-application hosts, and an authenticated-user endpoint reportedly exposed an Entra refresh token. Recommended actions are to immediately rotate the signing secret, invalidate all active sessions, replace client-held identity claims with random server-side session IDs, use distinct high-entropy secrets per environment, and review logs for anomalous session use, impersonation, token exposure, and administrative activity.


