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Security researcher Binary Security disclosed five critical cross-tenant elevation-of-privilege flaws in Azure Logic Apps API Connections that could allow an attacker to invoke a victim tenant’s configured API connection and use its credentials against the connected backend service. The reported attack paths included traversal in Azure Resource Manager (ARM) DynamicInvoke requests to target connections in other tenants, potentially exposing Azure Key Vault secrets, and undocumented dynamic endpoints such as DynamicList that reportedly enabled cross-tenant SQL operations.
A separate flaw affecting Consumption Logic Apps reportedly allowed replacement of a validated API endpoint through the host.api.RuntimeUrl property; an initial remediation was bypassed because URL validation preceded path normalization. Microsoft has fixed the reported issues and awarded the researcher a combined $200,000 bounty for the five critical vulnerabilities. No CVE identifiers or evidence of in-the-wild exploitation were provided in the disclosure.
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The researcher reported submitting five critical Azure elevation-of-privilege vulnerabilities involving API Connections. Microsoft fixed the vulnerabilities described in the report and awarded total rewards of $200,000, according to the author.
Microsoft initially required a submitted RuntimeUrl path to match the expected endpoint, but the researcher reportedly bypassed this control because validation occurred before URL-path normalization. The runtime and APIM consequently interpreted the path differently.
The researcher found that a Consumption Logic Apps workflow could supply a different host.api.RuntimeUrl after ownership validation of host.connection. A substituted azure-apihub.net URL reportedly received the required Authorization header, enabling use of another API endpoint.
Microsoft subsequently blocked the dynamic endpoints identified by the researcher, including endpoints in the DynamicInvoke and DynamicList family.
The researcher subsequently found that the undocumented DynamicList endpoint accepted traversable path parameters. A proof of concept reportedly used it to execute an arbitrary SQL INSERT against an Azure SQL database connected by a different tenant.
Microsoft initially mitigated the reported DynamicInvoke issue with path restrictions or blacklisting, rather than changing the underlying credential-routing design, according to the researcher.
A researcher identified a path-traversal flaw in Azure Resource Manager DynamicInvoke for Azure Logic Apps API Connections. Encoded dot-dot segments could direct requests to another tenant's connection, with a proof of concept reading a secret through a victim-connected Azure Key Vault.
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Researchers disclosed two severe flaws in **Azure API Connections** that exposed the trust model behind Microsoft’s managed connectors and could let attackers abuse authenticated connections to reach protected backend services. In the first issue, users with only **Reader** access to a connection could reportedly send authenticated requests through undocumented `/extensions/proxy` endpoints and inherit the connection’s existing privileges, exposing data from services including **Azure Key Vault, Azure SQL, Jira, Slack, Salesforce, Azure Storage, Defender ATP, and Google services**. The researcher also reported that the Jira connector could be abused for **SSRF** and API token theft when `APIToken` authentication was configured. A second report alleged that Azure’s globally shared API Management architecture for connectors enabled **cross-tenant compromise** through Azure Resource Manager’s undocumented `DynamicInvoke` endpoint. By combining a custom connector with path traversal, an attacker could reportedly make privileged requests against arbitrary victims’ API Connections and potentially control or extract data from connected backends with inherited administrator-level access. The researcher said Microsoft confirmed the issue within days, deployed mitigations within a week, and later awarded a **$40,000** bounty, although the published write-up warned the fix relied largely on blocking `../` and encoded variants and might be bypassable.
Aug 20, 2026
Microsoft remediated a critical Azure Automation vulnerability, tracked as **`CVE-2025-29827`** and rated **CVSS 9.9**, that could have allowed an attacker to take over another tenant’s automation identity. The issue stemmed from a public-by-default Azure Automation configuration combined with additional code flaws, creating an exploit chain that let an attacker with access to their own Azure Automation account impersonate identities across tenants and potentially reach data, credentials, scripts, and other cloud resources. Reporting on the flaw said the attack path required three weaknesses: publicly exposed Azure Automation account endpoints by default and two separate code-level bugs. Microsoft said it changed the default behavior so Azure Automation identities are no longer public by default, and no known in-the-wild exploitation has been reported. The finding echoes earlier research into Azure Automation security and underscores how cloud identity exposure and chained logic flaws can turn default service settings into high-impact cross-tenant compromise paths.
Jul 24, 2026
Microsoft disclosed and patched two **Azure Logic Apps Elevation of Privilege** vulnerabilities, tracked as `CVE-2026-42823` and `CVE-2026-32171`, through its Security Update Guide. Both advisories identify privilege-escalation issues affecting the Azure Logic Apps service, expanding the list of cloud platform flaws that could allow an attacker to gain higher permissions within impacted environments. The vulnerabilities were published in separate Microsoft advisories, with `CVE-2026-32171` appearing first and `CVE-2026-42823` added later. Microsoft provided the notices via MSRC update entries rather than detailed public write-ups, indicating customers should review the Security Update Guide and apply the relevant Azure-side remediations or service updates associated with their Logic Apps deployments.
Jul 12, 2026