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Sandworm Expands Global Access Operations and Targets Critical Infrastructure Suppliers

Active Exploitation · 3 sources · Updated 1mo ago · First seen Feb 20, 2025

Sandworm Expands Global Access Operations and Targets Critical Infrastructure Suppliers

Russian military intelligence-linked Sandworm, also tracked as APT44 and Seashell Blizzard, has pursued persistent access to organizations worldwide and attacked suppliers serving critical infrastructure. Microsoft reported that its “BadPilot” initial-access subgroup has exploited internet-facing systems since at least 2021, targeting energy, telecommunications, shipping, arms manufacturing, and governments, with activity expanding to the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia in 2024. Attackers exploited products including ScreenConnect, FortiClient EMS, Exchange, Zimbra, and TeamCity, then maintained access through web shells, remote management tools, OpenSSH, and the Tor-based ShadowLink capability. They also modified Outlook Web Access login pages and DNS records to harvest credentials. Microsoft assessed that the subgroup likely enabled at least three destructive attacks in Ukraine since 2023.

CERT-UA separately attributed supplier-focused campaigns observed between July 2024 and February 2025 to UAC-0212, a subcluster of Sandworm-linked UAC-0002. Targets in Serbia, Czechia, and Ukraine included logistics companies, grain-equipment manufacturers, and industrial automation providers. Attackers impersonated prospective customers, used PDF-linked lures, exploited CVE-2024-38213, and delivered disguised LNK files to execute PowerShell and deploy malware, including SECONDBEST/EMPIREPAST, SPARK, and the Go-based CROOKBAG loader; RSYNC supported document theft. CERT-UA warned that supplier compromises could enable subsequent attacks against critical infrastructure customers and that lateral movement can occur within hours. Defenders should prioritize exposed-system patching, investigate unauthorized persistence and credential-harvesting changes, and scope containment across the network rather than remediate only the initially infected endpoint.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

14 events · 2021 – Feb 20, 2025
  1. Reported Feb 23, 20252y ago

    CERT-UA attributes supplier attacks to UAC-0212 and publishes indicators

    CERT-UA identified the supplier-focused activity as UAC-0212, a subcluster of UAC-0002, and published malware, infrastructure, and host indicators, including evidence of RSYNC-assisted document theft. It warned that attackers move laterally within hours and that remediation limited to the initially infected computer does not resolve the wider compromise.

    CERT-UA
  2. Feb 20, 20252y ago

    CROOKBAG-associated domain object-storage-service.com is registered

    The domain object-storage-service[.]com was registered on February 20, 2025. CERT-UA associated the domain with CROOKBAG, a Go-based loader used in the supplier campaigns.

    CERT-UA
  3. Reported Feb 12, 20252y ago

    Microsoft discloses BadPilot research and persistence techniques

    Microsoft published research attributing BadPilot to a Seashell Blizzard subgroup linked to Russia's GRU Unit 74455. The research documented exploitation of at least eight perimeter-facing technologies and persistence methods including remote management tools, OpenSSH, the LocalOlive web shell, and Tor-based ShadowLink.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
  4. Jan 2025

    Attackers target Ukrainian automation and electrical-installation suppliers

    During January through February 20, 2025, attackers targeted at least twenty-five Ukrainian industrial process automation and electrical-installation enterprises. CERT-UA's preliminary review indicated that these suppliers served hundreds of electricity, heating, water, and wastewater enterprises.

    CERT-UA
  5. Jan 2025

    Attackers target four Ukrainian grain-equipment companies

    Between early January and February 20, 2025, attackers conducted cyberattacks against four Ukrainian companies specializing in grain drying, transportation and storage equipment, and grain-elevator construction.

    CERT-UA
  6. Dec 19, 20242y ago

    WebDAV delivery domain documents-reader.com is registered

    The domain documents-reader[.]com was registered on December 19, 2024. CERT-UA associated it with WebDAV delivery infrastructure used in the supplier-focused activity.

    CERT-UA
  7. Aug 2024

    Attackers target at least twelve Ukrainian logistics companies

    During August 2024, attackers targeted at least twelve Ukrainian logistics companies, including road, air, and maritime freight providers and companies handling dangerous or perishable cargo.

    CERT-UA
  8. Jul 2024

    UAC-0212 supplier campaigns target Serbia, Czechia, and Ukraine

    CERT-UA examined supplier-focused campaigns conducted from July 2024 through February 2025 in Serbia, Czechia, and Ukraine, noting a broader geographic scope. Attackers impersonated prospective customers and used malicious document lures to install malware and establish persistence.

    CERT-UA
  9. Apr 2024

    BadPilot exploits FortiClient EMS to retrieve remote-access installers

    During April 9–10, 2024, the subgroup exploited Fortinet FortiClient EMS vulnerability CVE-2023-48788 and retrieved remote agent installers from actor-controlled virtual private servers.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
  10. 2024

    CERT-UA uncovers plans to attack Ukrainian essential-service enterprises

    In the first quarter of 2024, CERT-UA uncovered plans for destructive cyberattacks against approximately twenty energy, water-supply, and heating enterprises across ten Ukrainian regions. It tracked the activity as UAC-0133 and linked the cluster to UAC-0002 with high confidence.

    CERT-UA
  11. 2024

    BadPilot expands access operations to the United States and United Kingdom

    Beginning in early 2024, the subgroup expanded its access operations to targets in the United States and United Kingdom. Microsoft identified exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect and Fortinet FortiClient EMS among its access techniques.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
  12. 2023

    BadPilot access likely enables destructive attacks in Ukraine

    Microsoft assessed that the subgroup likely enabled at least three destructive cyberattacks in Ukraine since 2023.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
  13. Oct 24, 20224y ago

    BadPilot exploits Zimbra through specially crafted email attachments

    On October 24, 2022, the subgroup exploited CVE-2022-41352 in Zimbra by sending specially crafted attachments from actor-controlled Proton and Outlook email addresses.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
  14. 2021

    BadPilot subgroup begins exploiting internet-facing infrastructure

    Microsoft reported that the Seashell Blizzard subgroup behind BadPilot was active since at least 2021, compromising internet-facing infrastructure for initial access and persistence. Activity between 2021 and 2023 predominantly affected Ukraine, Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.

    The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation | Microsoft Security Blog
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