Satori Variant Hijacks Claymore Mining Wallets Through Exposed Management APIs
Active Exploitation · 3 sources · Updated 1mo ago · First seen Jan 16, 2018

The Satori.Coin.Robber botnet variant targeted exposed Claymore Miner management interfaces to redirect Ethereum mining proceeds to an attacker-controlled wallet. Netlab researchers reported in January 2018 that the malware used unauthenticated access on TCP port 3333 to alter a reboot batch file, replace mining pool and wallet settings, and restart predominantly Windows mining hosts. Researchers observed approximately 4,900 unique scanning source IPs; the attacker’s mining account reportedly averaged 1,606 MH/s over two days and accumulated 0.1733 ETH in the preceding 24 hours. Separately, SANS reported increased port-3333 scanning in May 2018 and honeypot requests consistent with exploitation of CVE-2018-1000049, using Claymore’s JSON-RPC API to upload a reboot script and trigger its execution. That payload configured mining through Dwarfpool with a specified wallet.
The Satori variant also retained exploitation of CVE-2017-17215 on port 37215 and CVE-2014-8361 on port 52869, alongside asynchronous scanning and DNS-based command-and-control communication. CVE-2014-8361 permits remote code execution through a crafted NewInternalClient request to the Realtek SDK’s miniigd SOAP service; its CVE record reports exploitation in the wild through 2023 but provides no affected-version or remediation details. Operators should restrict Claymore management interfaces to trusted networks, verify mining pool and payout-wallet settings, and investigate unexpected reboot-script changes. Configuring Claymore with a negative management-port value enables read-only mode, disabling its most dangerous management functions.


