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Akira, a financially motivated ransomware operation active since early 2023, steals sensitive data before encrypting systems and threatens publication to pressure victims into paying. Its targets span healthcare, education, finance, manufacturing, and government across North America, Europe, and Australia. Reported figures indicate more than 250 affected organizations and approximately $42 million in ransom proceeds as of January 1, 2024; a separate leak-site claim cited more than 350 compromises. ThreatMon reported that Akira targeted Ecuador’s Xtrim TVCable in November 2024 and leaked financial records and customer data after ransom negotiations failed.
Akira commonly gains access through compromised VPN credentials, absent multifactor authentication, and vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA and Firepower Threat Defense software; reported techniques also include phishing and exploitation of weak credentials. Attackers then use readily available tools for credential theft, network discovery, and data exfiltration. Payloads include the original C++ ransomware, Rust-based Megazord, and Akira_v2, targeting Windows and VMware ESXi systems. Darkatlas associates the operation with PUNK SPIDER and GOLD SAHARA, although its ransomware-as-a-service status remains disputed. Priority defenses include enforcing multifactor authentication, patching and restricting VPN access, strengthening endpoint monitoring and access controls, and maintaining tested offline backups.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
10 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Akira reportedly targeted Ecuadorian telecommunications provider Xtrim TVCable in November 2024.
Akira was observed targeting an unnamed Latin American aerospace entity in June 2024. The reference does not specify the attack's outcome or whether data was encrypted or leaked.
Some Akira attacks began deploying Megazord, a Rust-based ransomware variant that appends the .powerranges extension. Operators continued using Megazord and other Akira variants interchangeably.
The first named leak-site victim associated with GOLD SAHARA appeared. The report identifies GOLD SAHARA as a cybercrime group deploying Akira ransomware.
PUNK SPIDER was first identified as a big-game-hunting adversary. The report describes it as developing and maintaining Akira ransomware and its dedicated leak site.
Akira operators introduced a Linux ransomware variant targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines, expanding beyond their initial focus on Windows systems.
Akira operations were first identified in March 2023. The financially motivated operation used double extortion, stealing victim data before encryption and threatening to publish it.
Third-party investigators observed Windows-specific Megazord ransomware and the Akira_v2 ESXi encryptor deployed concurrently during the same compromise.
On November 13–14 of an unspecified year, Akira published 35 leak-site posts: 32 newly named victims and three previously announced victims moved from News to Leaks. Twenty-five posts concerned organizations in the United States.
Following failed ransom negotiations, Akira reportedly leaked Xtrim TVCable's sensitive information, including financial records and customer data.
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Sophos reported that **Akira** has become a major threat to small and medium-sized organizations across Europe, North America, and Australia, hitting sectors including government, manufacturing, technology, education, consulting, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. The group commonly gained initial access through unauthorized logins to **Cisco ASA SSL VPN** and **Cisco AnyConnect** systems that lacked MFA, and in some cases exploited `CVE-2023-20269` and Veeam `CVE-2023-27532`. Researchers said Akira operators routinely stole credentials, moved laterally, established persistence, and attempted to evade defenses before either encrypting systems or stealing data for extortion. Sophos said Akira shifted notably toward **extortion-only** operations beginning in late 2023, exfiltrating data without always deploying ransomware. During intrusions, the actors dumped **LSASS**, extracted `NTDS.dit` and `SYSTEM` hives, targeted Veeam, browser, and KeePass credentials, and used tools including **Mimikatz, AdFind, Advanced IP Scanner, RDP, SMB, wmiexec, PsExec, AnyDesk, WinRAR, rclone, and MEGA**. The report also identified a previously unreported backdoor, **`crome.exe`**, communicating with `170.130.165[.]171`, alongside repeated efforts to disable Sophos and Microsoft Defender protections. When encryption was used, Akira deployed binaries such as `w.exe`, `Lck.exe`, `1.exe`, and `locker.exe`, appended the `.akira` extension, dropped `akira_readme.txt`, deleted Volume Shadow Copies, and in one case encrypted about 65,000 files on a server.
Aug 14, 2026
Researchers and incident responders reported that **Akira ransomware** affiliates used a repeatable intrusion playbook built around stolen VPN credentials and exploitation of internet-facing appliances, including Fortinet flaws `CVE-2019-6693` and `CVE-2022-40684` and Cisco ASA/FTD flaw `CVE-2023-20269`. Recovered attacker infrastructure exposed direct evidence of reconnaissance, credential theft, and exfiltration activity, including decrypted Fortinet configurations, password-protected RAR archives containing stolen victim data, and command history showing downloads from a public-facing victim server. Investigators said the operators relied heavily on legitimate administration tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, OpenSSH, MobaXterm, PowerShell, WMI, Impacket, WinSCP, FileZilla, and Cloudflared, while moving laterally through RDP and SMB and attempting to disable defenses, erase evidence, and destroy Veeam backups before encryption. Analysis of Akira’s malware and victim activity showed a **double-extortion** model that spans both Windows and Linux environments. The Linux variant supports selective path targeting, network-share encryption, partial encryption, file exclusions, and multithreaded execution using AES and RSA, dropping `akira_readme.txt` ransom notes with Tor-based contact details. Reporting also tied Akira to broad U.S.-focused targeting across sectors and suggested some operators may overlap with other ransomware-as-a-service programs, including possible links to Snatch. The group’s activity continued to affect organizations such as Texas-based **CF Supply**, where attackers were reported to have compromised corporate data that could include client project records, personal information, contracts, and agreements.
Aug 14, 2026
Sophos reported that newly emerged **Akira ransomware** was deployed in two separate April 2023 attacks against organizations in North America, with victims’ files renamed using the `.akira` extension and ransom notes dropped as `fn.txt`. The company said the strain appears unrelated to a 2017 ransomware family of the same name. In one intrusion, attackers gained access to an account through **MFA bypass** activity linked to **TOR exit nodes**, dumped `LSASS` memory via `comsvcs.dll` launched with `rundll32.exe`, moved laterally over **RDP**, tampered with **Windows Defender**, installed **AnyDesk**, and launched encryption after about seven days in the environment. In the second case, attackers entered through **single-factor VPN access**, likely harvested credentials as indicated by `MEMORY.DMP`, conducted reconnaissance with **Advanced IP Scanner** and **LANSweeper** data, used **Cloudflare Tunnel** and **Radmin** for remote access, and staged data with **WinRAR** before deploying ransomware after more than 30 days. Sophos said Akira targeted a relatively narrow set of 26 file extensions, focusing largely on databases, virtual disks, and memory image files while avoiding some file types to preserve system stability, and noted that the slower pace of both operations created multiple opportunities for defenders to detect and disrupt the attacks before encryption.
Jun 29, 2026