Citizen Lab and Confiant linked advertising operator Discover-Tech and its Controlium platform to large-scale identity collection and infrastructure supporting potential zero-click spyware delivery. An advertisement detected on April 12, 2026, led to infrastructure Citizen Lab attributed to Candiru, exposing an encrypted command-and-control framework capable of device fingerprinting, behavioral monitoring, and executing operator-supplied JavaScript. Discover-Tech also collected readable first-party cookies, including authenticated session identifiers and personal information, across more than 1,000 publisher domains, sometimes without GDPR consent. Researchers estimated its reach at 10 million daily ad impressions; exposed bidding records showed Discover-Tech-linked ads containing attacker script tags across more than 70,000 mobile apps and 120,000 websites between March and June.
Researchers estimated that millions of devices were directed to Candiru servers for potential profiling, while Candiru-linked campaigns were smaller and geographically selective. Discover-Tech ad impressions reached government, military, international organization, and critical infrastructure networks, but exposure does not establish targeting or compromise, and not every advertisement was necessarily weaponized. Confiant did not capture a complete exploit chain. The findings echo ESET’s earlier investigation of Middle Eastern watering-hole campaigns that profiled visitors before selectively redirecting them toward suspected browser exploits; ESET assessed with medium confidence that those operators were Candiru customers. Limited visibility remains a major detection obstacle, with Al Jazeera network logs providing essential evidence for one attack. Defenders should prioritize browser and mobile patching, scrutinize advertising-origin script activity, and assess exposure of readable session cookies.

TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
28 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The domains tracookiepixel[.]xyz and cookie-sync[.]xyz were suspended. Confiant noted that cookie-sync[.]xyz had not appeared active during its observation period.
Belgium experienced a combined Android and iOS advertising surge from July 21 through July 27. Separately, Belgium accounted for 56% of observed Candiru-attributed handoffs in Confiant's dataset.
Confiant observed a Windows-only spike in Discover-Tech advertising in Gibraltar, reaching 4.7% of observed ads.
An advertisement triggered Confiant's client-side cloaking heuristics and led to infrastructure attributed to Candiru through Citizen Lab's high-confidence findings. Confiant's investigation covered Discover-Tech activity from April 1 through September 10, 2026.
Discover-Tech advertisements reached a daily peak of 9.9% of observed ads in Palestine. Palestine had the operator's highest relative reach in Confiant's dataset.
Publicly exposed bidding records showed Discover-Tech-linked advertisements containing attacker script tags across more than 70,000 mobile apps and 120,000 websites between March and June 2026. Researchers cautioned that not all Discover-Tech advertisements were necessarily weaponized.
Confiant observed a Discover-Tech-injected payload using a /?qq= endpoint, encrypted WebSocket communications, device checks, and AES-encrypted JavaScript execution. It contained a misleading Google copyright comment resembling a decoy documented in ESET's Candiru research.
ESET reported that the second wave lasted until August 2021, after which compromised websites were cleaned again. Researchers were unable to retrieve the final exploit or payload.
The second-wave infrastructure switched to FingerprintJS Pro for extensive browser and device profiling with encrypted communications. The infrastructure could return JavaScript for execution in the current page.
The United States government placed Israeli spyware vendor Candiru, which has also used the name Integrity Labs, on its Entity List.
A second wave began, affecting Yemeni government and media websites, Syrian sites, Lebanese broadcasters, and South African Denel-related domains. Attackers modified existing website scripts and used cookie-based suppression to limit repeated malicious injections.
ESET detected that the Iranian embassy website in Abu Dhabi had been modified to inject JavaScript from piwiks[.]com. Other known compromised sites in the first wave included Middle East Eye, Piaggio Aerospace, and Lebanese outlet Al-Manar.
ESET assessed that strategic web compromises began when middleeasteye.net started injecting code from piwiks[.]com. The campaign profiled visitors and attempted to redirect selected Windows and macOS users toward a suspected browser exploit chain.
The piwiks[.]com domain was re-registered, marking the earliest campaign activity ESET traced. Attackers subsequently used it to deliver malicious JavaScript through compromised websites.
ESET researchers built an internal system to detect strategic web compromises on high-profile websites. The system later helped uncover Candiru-linked activity targeting visitors to Middle Eastern websites.
The reported Discover-Tech-linked spyware operation also targeted media organizations in Austria, Denmark, France, Mexico, Israel, Italy, Norway, and Sweden, alongside international media-service networks. The reference does not establish successful infections at these additional organizations.
Researchers reported that a separate threat actor, Dark Cartographer, uses Discover-Tech's software and exploits mobile-carrier vulnerabilities to associate device advertising identifiers with phone numbers, facilitating mass deanonymization.
Google terminated Discover-Tech's access to its advertising exchanges and removed it from approved vendor lists; IAB Europe also removed the company from its approved vendor list. Beeswax, Vungle, and Eskimi took unspecified actions against Discover-Tech following the findings.
Citizen Lab found that spyware vendors Bindecy and Candiru used Discover-Tech's Controlium advertising platform to target people. Publicly accessible login records included details belonging to Bindecy employees and at least two Candiru employees.
Investigators recovered a Windows DLL from a compromised device and attributed it to Candiru with high confidence. The component used COM hijacking for persistence, a repeating 48-byte XOR method to conceal strings, and two command-and-control domains.
Citizen Lab reported spyware infections at Al Jazeera and identified zero-click attacks targeting at least 45 of the outlet's devices. Researchers linked the attacks with high confidence to Candiru spyware delivered through Discover-Tech advertisements, but could not attribute them to a specific operating party.
Confiant identified organizational and technical connections through public code repositories, passive DNS, shared AWS certificates, and a shared Wix account identifier. These findings linked Discover-Tech and MyIPInfo to Intelos, Adtimizer, and Tekma.
Researchers observed Discover-Tech advertisements on government, military, critical infrastructure, NATO, and United Nations networks. Confiant cautioned that this advertising reach did not establish deliberate targeting or compromise, and most observed Candiru-linked impressions reached residential or mobile connections.
Confiant observed Discover-Tech collecting readable first-party cookie jars across more than 1,000 publisher domains, including authenticated session identifiers and sometimes email addresses and names. Some collection occurred in EU scenarios without consent for GDPR-covered processing.
Confiant documented hidden advertising iframes that loaded an obfuscated SDK capable of encrypted command-and-control, device fingerprinting, behavioral monitoring, and operator-supplied JavaScript execution. Researchers did not capture a complete exploit chain or demonstrate a browser sandbox escape.
Citizen Lab identified Discover-Tech as the operator of Controlium, an advertising platform it said could de-anonymize, fingerprint, and automatically infect devices when an advertisement appears. Researchers estimated that millions of devices had been directed to Candiru servers for potential profiling.
ESET linked the activity to the cluster Kaspersky tracks as Karkadann and assessed with medium confidence that the operators were Candiru customers. Its investigation documented selective visitor profiling and suspected browser exploitation rather than recovery of a complete exploit chain.
The first wave ended in late July or early August 2020 when malicious code was removed from compromised websites. ESET assessed that the attackers likely performed the cleanup.
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