XLoader Campaign Uses Order-Themed Emails, LuaJIT and In-Memory Injection
Malware Intelligence · 4 sources · Updated 13d ago · First seen Nov 1, 2026

Morphisec investigated an XLoader campaign that used business order-themed emails and archives containing obfuscated JScript to deliver an embedded x86 LuaJIT interpreter, a Lua loader and an encoded native payload. The loader attempted to interfere with local security functions and manually mapped a packed executable into the LuaJIT process, where the packer decrypted and executed XLoader. The malware then transferred a cloned stage into another x86 process through shared-section mapping and thread-context redirection, rather than process hollowing. Recovered code supported network command processing, Windows Vault enumeration and cookie-record preparation. Scheduled-task persistence depended on a marker file; neither persistence creation nor successful security-function patching was confirmed in the analyzed chain.
Separate Zscaler ThreatLabz research into XLoader versions 8.1 and later documented increasingly complex runtime decryption, opaque predicates, stack-built parameters and obfuscated constants designed to frustrate analysis. The FormBook-derived malware steals credentials and sensitive data and supports follow-on payload execution, self-update and other remote commands. Its communications use plaintext HTTP carrying multiple RC4-based encryption layers, SHA-1-derived keys tied to the command-and-control URL, and Base64 encoding. ThreatLabz identified 65 runtime-decrypted C2 IP addresses, including decoys, with randomized subset selection; Morphisec likewise found decoy endpoints that prevented identifying the actual C2 server from configuration alone. Defenders should prioritize suspicious email archives, unexpected LuaJIT execution and cross-process memory activity rather than relying solely on extracted endpoint lists.


