Local Privilege Escalation in Fortinet FortiClientLinux via Symlinked Shared Object Loading
CVE-2026-24018 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability affecting Fortinet FortiClientLinux 7.4.0 through 7.4.4 and 7.2.2 through 7.2.12. The flaw is described as a UNIX symbolic link following issue in FortiClient's handling of certain shared objects. A local attacker with low privileges can create a symbolic link that causes a FortiClient service running with elevated privileges to load and execute an arbitrary shared object. Because the targeted service executes in the root security context, successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution as root.
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small local privilege-escalation exploit for CVE-2026-24018 affecting Fortinet FortiClientLinux. It contains only two files: a README describing the target vulnerability and a single Bash exploit script, exploit.sh, which is the main entry point. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. Its purpose is to abuse a symlink-following issue in FortiClient Linux by modifying a VPN profile through /opt/forticlient/forticlient-cli so that FortiClient later loads an attacker-controlled shared object from /tmp/evil.so. The script supports a default mode that automatically prepares a profile and a more interactive mode where the operator can choose a VPN name and provide an arbitrary command to run as root. Operational flow: 1. Verifies FortiClient is installed at /opt/forticlient. 2. Prepares a malicious shared library. If gcc is present, it writes a small C source file and compiles it as /tmp/evil.so; otherwise it decodes a bundled base64 ELF shared object. 3. The shared object’s _init() function calls setuid(0), setgid(0), and executes bash /tmp/fortinet.sh. 4. The script writes /tmp/fortinet.sh containing either a default payload that copies /bin/sh to /tmp/sh and sets mode 4755, or an operator-supplied command. 5. It edits a FortiClient VPN profile using piped input to forticlient-cli, inserting /tmp/evil.so into the vulnerable configuration path. 6. It attempts to identify or set GUI environment variables (DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY), then launches /opt/forticlient/fortitray and /opt/forticlient/gui/FortiClient to trigger the vulnerable code path. 7. In the default path, it waits briefly and then executes /tmp/sh -p to obtain a root shell. If no GUI session is active, it can optionally drop ~/.config/autostart/forticlient.desktop so the GUI launches automatically on next login and triggers the payload later. The exploit is clearly functional exploit code rather than a detector. It is operational because it includes a working payload and fallback binary blob, but it is not highly modular or framework-based. There are no external network callbacks or C2 endpoints; the only network-like observables are local VPN configuration values such as 127.0.0.1:10443 and port 443 used as profile data during setup. The main fingerprintable artifacts are the FortiClient installation paths, the dropped files in /tmp, and the optional autostart desktop entry.
Affected products & vendors
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
The version that knows your environment.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.