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Go crypto/x509 excluded DNS constraints wildcard case validation bypass

IdentifiersCVE-2026-33810CWE-295· Improper Certificate Validation

CVE-2026-33810 is a certificate validation flaw in Go 1.26's crypto/x509 component. When verifying a certificate chain that contains excluded DNS name constraints, the verification logic does not correctly apply those constraints to wildcard DNS Subject Alternative Names when the wildcard SAN uses different letter casing than the excluded constraint. As described in the provided content, a certificate containing a SAN such as "*.example.com" can evade an excluded DNS constraint such as "EXAMPLE.COM" because the constraint comparison is handled incorrectly for this wildcard-and-case combination. The issue affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains anchored by a root CA present in VerifyOptions.Roots or in the system certificate pool.

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Impact

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Successful exploitation can cause incorrect acceptance of a certificate chain that should have been rejected under excluded DNS name constraints. In practice, this is a certificate validation bypass in which name constraints meant to prohibit issuance or acceptance for a DNS namespace are not enforced for certain wildcard SANs with case mismatches. This can undermine trust decisions made by applications relying on Go crypto/x509 for certificate verification, potentially allowing use of an otherwise trusted but policy-violating certificate for prohibited domains.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

As an interim measure, avoid relying solely on the vulnerable excluded-DNS-constraint handling path in Go 1.26 for security decisions. Where feasible, restrict trust anchors to only those required, avoid accepting chains from unnecessary roots in VerifyOptions.Roots or the system trust store, and perform additional hostname or certificate policy validation in higher-level application logic if operationally possible. The definitive mitigation is to patch/upgrade, because the flaw is in certificate verification logic.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade from vulnerable Go 1.26 builds to a fixed Go release containing the crypto/x509 correction for CVE-2026-33810. The provided content indicates the issue was addressed in the Go security releases following disclosure and references downstream fixes in vendor errata. Rebuild and redeploy applications statically linked against vulnerable Go standard library versions as appropriate for the environment, since Go applications commonly embed the affected library code.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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EXPOSURE SURFACE

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GolangGoapplication

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