A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Microsoft Phone Book Service, which allows local users to execute arbitrary commands. The flaw is due to improper bounds checking in the service, enabling attackers to overwrite memory and potentially gain elevated privileges or execute arbitrary code.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (ms00_094_pbserver.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS Phone Book Service (pbserver.dll), as described in MS00-094 (CVE-2000-1089). The exploit works by sending an overly long URL argument to the vulnerable DLL via an HTTP request, causing a stack overflow and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module is designed for Windows 2000 SP1, SP0, and Windows NT SP6. The payload is customizable via the Metasploit framework and is delivered as part of the overflow buffer. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the default vulnerable path '/pbserver/pbserver.dll'. The code is operational and leverages Metasploit's HttpClient mixin for network communication. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file, typical for Metasploit exploit modules.
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