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A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in PoPToP PPTP server versions prior to 1.1.4-b3 and 1.1.3-20030409, specifically in the ctrlpacket.c file. The vulnerability is triggered by improper validation of the PPTP packet header's length field. If a remote attacker sends a packet with a length field of 0 or 1, the server calculates a negative value for a subsequent read operation, resulting in a stack-based buffer overflow. This is due to GLIBC's handling of negative or large size parameters, making Linux systems primarily affected. Solaris and *BSD are not vulnerable due to their libc implementations.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (4 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting the Poptop PPTP server negative read overflow vulnerability (CVE-2003-0213). The exploit is implemented in Ruby and is designed to be used within the Metasploit Framework. It targets Linux systems running vulnerable versions of Poptop (prior to 1.1.3-b3 and 1.1.3-20030409) by sending a specially crafted PPTP control packet to the service on TCP port 1723. The exploit supports brute-forcing return addresses and allows for customizable payloads, typically resulting in remote code execution as a privileged user. The module includes options for adjusting payload space and protocol fields, and references several advisories and resources. The structure is standard for Metasploit modules, with clear separation of initialization, payload construction, and exploitation logic.
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