Loading vulnerability…
A buffer overflow exists in the ntlm_check_auth function of Squid Web Proxy Cache versions 2.5.x and 3.x when compiled with NTLM handlers enabled. The vulnerability is triggered by supplying an overly long password (the 'pass' variable) during NTLM authentication, which can overflow a buffer and potentially allow code execution.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in Squid's NTLM authentication handler (CVE-2004-0541). The exploit abuses improper bounds checking in the 'ntlm_check_auth' function of Squid's libntlmssp.c, allowing an attacker to overflow a stack variable with user-controlled data. The module is designed for Linux platforms and uses brute force to find the correct return address for exploitation. It sends specially crafted HTTP requests with NTLM authentication headers to the Squid proxy, triggering the overflow and executing arbitrary payloads (such as a shell) on the target system. The exploit is operational and allows for customizable payloads via the Metasploit framework. The only network endpoint referenced is a randomly generated HTTP URL used in the exploit's requests. The module is well-structured, with clear separation of negotiation and authentication phases, and includes options for brute force timing. The repository is a typical Metasploit module, with all logic contained in a single Ruby file.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.