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A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the logging component of CCProxy. The flaw is triggered when the application processes a long HTTP GET request, which can overflow an internal buffer and allow for the execution of arbitrary code.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the YoungZSoft CCProxy Telnet service (CVE-2004-2416). The exploit works by sending an overly long address to the 'ping' command over the Telnet interface (TCP port 23), causing a stack overflow and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module supports multiple language versions of Windows 2000 and Windows XP, and allows the attacker to deliver a customizable payload (up to 1012 bytes, avoiding certain bad characters). The exploit is operational and can be used to gain remote code execution on vulnerable systems. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the Telnet service on TCP port 23. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file compatible with the Metasploit framework.
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