A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wsprintf function of W32Dasm version 8.93 and earlier. The vulnerability is triggered when the application processes a large import or export function name, leading to a buffer overflow condition. This flaw allows an attacker to overwrite memory and potentially execute arbitrary code within the context of the affected application.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a buffer overflow vulnerability in URSoft W32Dasm (<= v8.93) on Windows XP SP0 (CVE-2005-0308). The exploit works by generating a specially crafted executable file (default name: msf-w32dasm.exe) that, when opened with the vulnerable W32Dasm application, triggers a stack-based buffer overflow via the Imports/Exports function. This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running W32Dasm. The exploit is implemented in Ruby as part of the Metasploit framework and leverages the FILEFORMAT exploit mixin. The payload is customizable, with a default space of 256 bytes, and is injected into the malicious file. The attack vector is local, requiring user interaction to open the file. The repository structure is typical for Metasploit modules, with all logic contained in a single Ruby file under the appropriate directory. No network endpoints or external services are involved; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the malicious file itself.
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