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A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the Plug and Play (PnP) service (UMPNPMGR.DLL) in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4 and Windows XP SP1/SP2. The vulnerability is triggered when a large number of backslash () characters are used in a registry key name, which is improperly handled by a wsprintfW function call, leading to a buffer overflow. This flaw can be exploited by remote or local authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting the Microsoft Plug and Play service stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2005-2120, MS05-047) on Windows 2000 systems. The exploit is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that remotely crashes the Plug and Play service via a specially crafted DCERPC request over SMB, causing the system to reboot. The module does not require authentication and can be executed against a vulnerable target by specifying the appropriate SMB named pipe (default: 'browser'). The code is written in Ruby and leverages Metasploit's DCERPC and SMB client libraries. No payload is delivered; the exploit's effect is limited to service crash and system reboot. The repository structure is typical for Metasploit modules, with the exploit logic contained in a single Ruby file under the auxiliary/dos/windows/smb directory.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.