HP OpenView Network Node Manager versions 6.2 through 7.50 are vulnerable to command injection via several .ovpl CGI scripts (connectedNodes.ovpl, cdpView.ovpl, freeIPaddrs.ovpl, ecscmg.ovpl). The vulnerability is due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input in the 'node' parameter, allowing shell metacharacters to be injected and executed on the server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (openview_connectednodes_exec.rb) that exploits a remote command execution vulnerability in the HP OpenView connectedNodes.ovpl CGI application (CVE-2005-2773). The exploit works by sending a specially crafted HTTP GET request to the vulnerable script, injecting arbitrary shell commands via the 'node' parameter. The output of the command is returned in the HTTP response, allowing the attacker to view the results. The module is operational and leverages Metasploit's payload system to deliver arbitrary commands. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the default URI path to the vulnerable script: /OvCgi/connectedNodes.ovpl. The exploit targets HP OpenView on Unix platforms and requires the CGI script to be accessible over the network. The repository is structured as a typical Metasploit module, with all exploit logic contained in a single Ruby file.
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