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CVE-2006-1652 describes multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in UltraVNC 1.0.1 and earlier, as well as tabbed_viewer 1.29. The vulnerabilities exist in the Log::ReallyPrint and VNCLog::ReallyPrint functions, which fail to properly handle long strings received from a malicious server (on TCP port 5900) or via a long HTTP GET request (on TCP port 5800). These overflows can be triggered when a client connects to a malicious server or when a server receives a crafted HTTP request.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a buffer overflow vulnerability in UltraVNC Win32 Viewer 1.0.1 (CVE-2006-1652). The exploit works by running a malicious TCP server (default port 5900) that mimics a VNC server. When a vulnerable UltraVNC client connects, the module sends a specially crafted response that overflows a buffer in the client, allowing arbitrary code execution. The exploit supports customizable payloads (up to 500 bytes, avoiding null bytes) and targets Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2, and Windows 2003 SP1 (English versions). The main entry point is the Ruby file 'modules/exploits/windows/vnc/ultravnc_client.rb', which uses Metasploit's TcpServer mixin to handle incoming connections and deliver the exploit. No hardcoded IP addresses or domains are present; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the TCP port 5900. The exploit is operational and allows for arbitrary code execution on the victim system upon successful exploitation.
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