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CVE-2006-2086 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the Juniper SSL-VPN Client ActiveX component chain where JuniperSetup.ocx loads JuniperSetupDLL.dll. When a client accesses a Juniper NetScreen IVE device running vulnerable IVE OS versions (before 4.2r8.1; 5.0 before 5.0r6.1; 5.1 before 5.1r8; 5.2 before 5.2r4.1; or 5.3 before 5.3r2.1), a long argument supplied via the ProductName parameter (specifically a long ProductName argument in the ProductName parameter) can overflow a buffer in JuniperSetupDLL.dll, enabling arbitrary code execution on the client in the context of the logged-in user.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the JuniperSetupDLL.dll library, which is invoked by the JuniperSetup.ocx ActiveX control as part of the Juniper SSL-VPN (IVE) appliance. The exploit is triggered when a victim visits a malicious web page hosted by the attacker. The page instantiates the vulnerable ActiveX control using its CLSID and passes an overly long string to the 'ProductName' parameter, causing a buffer overflow and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module is written in Ruby and leverages Metasploit's HttpServer::HTML mixin to serve the exploit page. The payload is customizable and can be any Metasploit payload suitable for Windows. The exploit targets Windows platforms (specifically Windows XP Pro SP3 is referenced) and is associated with CVE-2006-2086. The main attack vector is through the browser, requiring user interaction (visiting the malicious page). The only fingerprintable endpoints are the HTTP server root (serving the exploit) and the specific CLSID of the vulnerable ActiveX control.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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