A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in D-Link TFTP Server 1.0, where remote attackers can trigger memory corruption by sending a long GET or PUT request. This flaw is due to improper bounds checking on user-supplied input, leading to a buffer overflow condition.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit exploit module targeting a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in D-Link TFTP 1.0 (CVE-2007-1435). The exploit works by sending a specially crafted TFTP request with an overly long filename to the target's UDP port 69, causing a buffer overflow and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module is written in Ruby and leverages the Metasploit framework's UDP and payload handling capabilities. It supports payload customization, with a default recommendation for bind payloads without NX (No eXecute) protection. The exploit specifically targets Windows 2000 SP3 and SP4 (English) systems running the vulnerable D-Link TFTP service. The structure is typical for a Metasploit module, with clear definition of targets, payload space, and exploit logic. No hardcoded IP addresses or domain names are present; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the UDP port 69 used by TFTP.
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