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Multiple stack-based buffer overflows exist in the PVATLCalendar.PVCalendar.1 ActiveX control (pvcalendar.ocx) used by the scheduler component in Symantec Backup Exec for Windows Server (BEWS) versions 11d (11.0.6235, 11.0.7170) and 12.0 (12.0.1364). The vulnerability is triggered when a remote attacker provides an overly long value to any of the _DOWText[0-6] or _MonthText[0-11] properties and invokes the Save method, resulting in a buffer overflow. This can be exploited when a user loads a malicious web page or object that instantiates the vulnerable ActiveX control.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the Symantec BackupExec Calendar Control (pvcalendar.ocx ActiveX control), as described in CVE-2007-6016. The exploit is delivered via a malicious HTML page served by the Metasploit framework, which uses JavaScript to trigger the overflow by assigning an overly long string to the '_DOWText0' property of the ActiveX control. The module is designed for use against Windows XP SP0-SP2 systems running Internet Explorer 6 or 7. The payload is customizable via the Metasploit framework and typically results in arbitrary code execution (e.g., a reverse shell) on the victim's machine. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the CLSID of the vulnerable ActiveX control (22ACD16F-99EB-11D2-9BB3-00400561D975) and the file name 'pvcalendar.ocx'. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file implementing the exploit logic, with embedded JavaScript for the client-side attack.
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