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A command injection vulnerability exists in Coppermine Photo Gallery (CPG) before version 1.4.15, specifically in the include/imageObjectIM.class.php file. When the ImageMagick picture processing method is enabled, the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input in the 'quality', 'angle', and 'clipval' parameters passed to picEditor.php. This allows remote attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands on the server via shell metacharacters in these parameters.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a command execution vulnerability in Coppermine Photo Gallery (CVE-2008-0506). The exploit abuses improper input sanitization in the 'angle' parameter of picEditor.php when Coppermine is configured to use ImageMagick. The module sends a crafted POST request to /picEditor.php, injecting arbitrary shell commands via the 'angle' parameter. The payload is provided by the Metasploit framework and executed as the web server user. The exploit requires knowledge of the Coppermine installation path (default: /cpg1414) and that the target is running a vulnerable version with ImageMagick enabled. The code is weaponized, allowing for customizable payloads and automated exploitation. The only fingerprintable endpoints are the vulnerable /picEditor.php script and the default installation path. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file compatible with the Metasploit framework.
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