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A stack-based buffer overflow exists in Orbit Downloader versions 2.6.3 and 2.6.4. The vulnerability is triggered when a failed download with a specially crafted, overly long URL is processed. During the display of a balloon notification, the application improperly handles the conversion of the ASCII URL to Unicode using the MultiByteToWideChar API, allowing up to 16384 bytes to be written into an 8192-byte stack buffer. This can result in remote code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-1602) in Orbit Downloader version 6.4 for Windows. The exploit works by generating a malicious .metalink file, which, when opened via the 'Add Metalink...' feature in Orbit Downloader, triggers a Unicode conversion overflow due to insecure use of MultiByteToWideChar. The module allows the attacker to specify a payload (such as a reverse shell), which is encoded for Unicode compatibility and embedded in the malicious file. The exploit is operational and leverages local file-based attack vectors, requiring user interaction to open the crafted file. The module is written in Ruby and is structured according to Metasploit conventions, with all logic contained in a single file. Notable endpoints include the generated .metalink file and URLs embedded within the file, one of which is dynamically constructed to trigger the overflow.
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