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Stack-based buffer overflow in the Apache Connector plugin (mod_wl) used with Oracle WebLogic Server (formerly BEA WebLogic Server) 10.3 and earlier. A remote attacker can trigger the overflow by sending an HTTP request containing an overly long HTTP version string (e.g., a long string following "POST /.jsp"), leading to memory corruption and potential arbitrary code execution in the context of the affected process.
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LimitRequestLine 4000 in httpd.conf and restart Apache) to reduce exposure to overly long request components. Optionally deploy a WAF such as mod_security to filter malformed/invalid HTTP requests targeting this condition.Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/windows/http/bea_weblogic_post_bof.rb) that exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-3257) in the BEA WebLogic Apache connector (mod_wl_20.so) on Windows systems (2000/XP). The exploit targets WebLogic versions 8.1 SP4, SP5, and SP6, and works by sending a specially crafted HTTP POST request to a WebLogic-served resource (default: /index.jsp). The module includes logic to fingerprint the WebLogic connector version using a POST request with a crafted Transfer-Encoding header, and then delivers a payload that can execute arbitrary code on the target system. The payload is customizable via the Metasploit framework, with a default space of 4000 bytes and certain bad characters excluded. The exploit is operational and requires the target to be running a vulnerable version of the connector on a Windows system without DEP enabled. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the HTTP path (default /index.jsp), which can be customized. The module is well-structured, with clear separation of fingerprinting, targeting, and exploitation logic.
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