Loading vulnerability…
A remote command execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Host Integration Server (HIS) 2000, 2004, and 2006 due to insufficient access control on the SNA RPC management interface. The service fails to restrict access to administrative RPC functions, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to send crafted SNA RPC messages (opcodes 1 or 6) that invoke the CreateProcess function with attacker-supplied parameters, resulting in arbitrary code execution under the context of the affected service.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting Microsoft Host Integration Server 2006 (MS08-059, CVE-2008-3466). The module exploits a command-injection vulnerability in the server's RPC interface (UUID: ed6ee250-e0d1-11cf-925a-00aa00c006c1) to execute arbitrary system commands remotely. The exploit works by discovering the correct RPC port on the target, binding to the vulnerable interface, and sending a crafted RPC call (opcode 0x01) with user-supplied command and arguments. The default payload writes a file ('metasploit.txt') to the target system, but any command can be specified. The module is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit Framework. No hardcoded IPs or URLs are present, but the exploit targets a specific DCERPC UUID. The included IDL code in comments documents the RPC interface and available opcodes. The exploit is operational and provides remote command execution on vulnerable systems.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.