Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2008-4210 is a vulnerability in the Linux kernel (prior to 2.6.22) where fs/open.c does not properly strip setuid and setgid bits when a file is written to. This allows local users to gain the privileges of a different group by creating an executable file in a setgid directory using the truncate or ftruncate functions in conjunction with memory-mapped I/O. The vulnerable function fails to clear the setuid/setgid bits as required, leading to potential privilege escalation.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This eight-file repository is a small collection of three standalone historical Linux kernel local privilege-escalation exploits, with one C source file and one CVE reference README per vulnerability, plus a root README and MIT license. It contains no network client, server, C2, remote target, or framework integration. CVE-2008-0600/5093.c is a 32-bit vmsplice exploit for Linux 2.6.23-2.6.24 that obtains a kernel symbol address from /proc/kallsyms and modifies current-process credentials to root. CVE-2008-0900/5092.c is a more broadly versioned vmsplice exploit for Linux 2.6.17-2.6.24.1, supporting i386 and x86_64 through architecture-specific return-to-user-mode code; it constructs fake mapped page metadata and triggers vmsplice with ULONG_MAX length. Both attempt to suppress shell history and spawn /bin/bash interactively after escalation. CVE-2008-4210/6851.c targets pre-2.6.22 open/ftruncate behavior by creating an SGID copy of ash/sash in a writable SGID directory; its outcome is SGID elevation rather than necessarily full root, and its shell-selection logic is visibly unreliable. The repository is functional exploit code rather than detection-only material, although its tight dependence on obsolete kernel versions, architecture/layout assumptions, and legacy system configuration makes it a historical proof-of-concept collection.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.