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A stack-based buffer overflow exists in VideoLAN VLC media player versions 0.9.x before 0.9.6, specifically in the ParseRealText function within modules/demux/subtitle.c. The vulnerability is triggered when VLC parses a maliciously crafted RealText (rt) subtitle file, due to insufficient bounds checking on stack buffers 'psz_end' and 'psz_begin' when using sscanf(). This can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code if a user opens a video file with a matching malicious subtitle file.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (vlc_realtext.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-5036) in VideoLAN VLC Media Player versions prior to 0.9.6, specifically tested on 0.9.4 for Windows XP SP3 and Windows 7 SP1. The exploit works by generating two files: a crafted .mp4 video file and a malicious .rt (RealText subtitle) file. The victim is tricked into opening the .mp4 file with VLC, which then loads the .rt subtitle file from the same directory, triggering the buffer overflow and executing arbitrary code (Metasploit payload) with the user's privileges. The module allows for customizable payloads up to 1900 bytes, with certain bad characters filtered. The attack vector is local, requiring user interaction to open the malicious files. No network endpoints are involved. The code is operational and ready for use within the Metasploit framework.
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