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Free Download Manager (FDM) versions 2.5 Build 758 and 3.0 Build 844 contain multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the torrent parsing implementation. Specifically, the application fails to properly validate the length of certain fields in torrent files, including the file name, tracker URL, and comment fields. An attacker can craft a malicious torrent file with excessively long values in these fields to trigger a buffer overflow, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution when the file is opened in FDM.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (fdm_torrent.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-0184) in Free Download Manager 3.0 Build 844 for Windows. The exploit works by generating a specially crafted .torrent file (default name: msf.torrent) with a maliciously long 'name' field, which triggers a SEH-based buffer overflow when parsed by the vulnerable application. The module allows the attacker to inject a customizable payload, leading to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user who opens the file. The code includes custom bencoding routines to generate valid torrent files. The attack vector is local, requiring user interaction to open the malicious file. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file compatible with the Metasploit framework, and all exploit logic is contained within this file.
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