A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Apple iTunes versions prior to 8.2. The vulnerability is triggered when iTunes parses a specially crafted 'itms:' URL containing an excessively long component after a colon. This flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by enticing a user to open a maliciously crafted URL. The vulnerability affects iTunes on Mac OS X v10.4.10 or later, Mac OS X Server v10.4.10 or later, and Windows Vista or XP SP2 or later.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (3 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/multi/browser/itms_overflow.rb) that exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Apple iTunes 8.1.1's handling of itms:// URLs (CVE-2009-0950). The exploit is delivered via a malicious HTML page served by the module's built-in HTTP server. When a victim visits the page using Safari (or another browser that automatically opens itms:// URLs in iTunes), a specially crafted itms:// URL is triggered, causing a buffer overflow in iTunes and allowing arbitrary code execution. The payload is customizable and must be vfork-based due to iTunes' multithreaded architecture. The module is written in Ruby and is designed to be used within the Metasploit Framework. The main attack vector is browser-based, leveraging the automatic handling of itms:// URLs on Mac OS X. The only fingerprintable endpoints are the itms:// protocol handler and the HTTP server endpoint serving the exploit page.
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