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A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the MPS.StormPlayer.1 ActiveX control (mps.dll version 3.9.4.27 and earlier) used by Baofeng Storm. The vulnerability is triggered by passing an overly long argument to the OnBeforeVideoDownload method, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code. This vulnerability was exploited in the wild in April and May 2009.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-1612) in the BaoFeng Storm Player ActiveX control (mps.dll, version 3.9.4.27 and lower). The exploit is delivered via a malicious HTTP server that serves a crafted HTML page with obfuscated JavaScript. When a victim using Internet Explorer (6 or 7) on Windows XP or Vista visits the page, the JavaScript instantiates the vulnerable ActiveX control and triggers the OnBeforeVideoDownload method with an overly long string, causing a buffer overflow. The exploit uses a heap spray technique to deliver attacker-controlled shellcode, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's system. The module is operational and allows the attacker to specify a custom Metasploit payload. The main file is written in Ruby, with embedded JavaScript and HTML for the client-side attack. No external network endpoints are hardcoded, but the exploit is served from a configurable HTTP path (default '/'). The module is suitable for use in penetration testing and red teaming against vulnerable environments.
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