Loading vulnerability…
PeaZIP 2.6.1, 2.5.1, and earlier on Windows contains a command execution vulnerability triggered when a user opens a specially crafted .zip archive. The issue is caused by unsafe handling of archive entry filenames, specifically a .txt file whose filename includes pipe (|) characters followed by attacker-controlled command content. When the malicious archive is processed, the crafted filename can be interpreted in a way that results in execution of arbitrary commands on the victim system. The vulnerability is user-assisted because exploitation requires the target to open the malicious archive in a vulnerable PeaZIP version on Windows.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby) that exploits a command injection vulnerability in PeaZip versions prior to 2.6.2 (CVE-2009-2261). The exploit works by creating a specially crafted zip file with a filename that injects an attacker-supplied command. When a victim opens the zip file with PeaZip and double-clicks the malicious file, the command is executed as the victim user. The module allows the attacker to specify the command to be executed via the 'CMD' option. The exploit targets PeaZip on Windows, Linux, and Unix platforms. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the malicious zip file ('msf.zip') generated by the module. The repository is structured as a typical Metasploit exploit module and is operational, requiring user interaction for successful exploitation.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.