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A vulnerability in win32k.sys in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2/SP3, and Server 2003 SP2 allows remote code execution due to improper parsing of font code during the construction of a directory-entry table when handling Embedded OpenType (EOT) fonts. An attacker can exploit this by convincing a user to open a malicious EOT font, typically via a web page or document.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting a denial-of-service vulnerability (CVE-2009-2514, MS09-065) in Microsoft Windows. The exploit abuses an integer overflow in the win32k.sys kernel driver when parsing Embedded OpenType (EOT) fonts. The module acts as a malicious HTTP server: when a victim visits the server (typically via Internet Explorer), it serves an HTML page that references a specially crafted EOT font. When the vulnerable Windows system attempts to parse the font, the integer overflow is triggered, resulting in a Blue Screen of Death (BSoD). The exploit does not provide code execution, only denial of service. The main file is a Ruby script designed for the Metasploit framework, and it requires a template EOT file (pricedown.eot) to generate the malicious payload. No hardcoded IPs or URLs are present; the attack is delivered via the attacker's web server. The repository is structured as a single Metasploit module, and its purpose is to demonstrate and test the vulnerability in a controlled environment.
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