A memory corruption vulnerability exists in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 and 7 due to improper handling of objects in memory that are either uninitialized or deleted. The vulnerability can be triggered via a crafted web page that uses the getElementsByTagName method for the STYLE tag, selects the single element in the returned list, and modifies its outerHTML property. This flaw is related to the handling of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) in mshtml.dll and can result in memory corruption, leading to arbitrary code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (ms09_072_style_object.rb) that exploits a memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2009-3672) in the getElementsByTagName function of Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 and 7 on Windows platforms. The exploit works by serving a specially crafted HTML page with embedded JavaScript to the victim's browser. The JavaScript performs a heap spray with attacker-controlled shellcode and triggers the vulnerability via manipulation of a STYLE element, leading to arbitrary code execution. The module is operational and allows the attacker to deliver any Metasploit-compatible payload. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the HTTP server that serves the malicious page. The code is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, with the main logic in the on_request_uri method, which handles incoming HTTP requests and delivers the exploit. The repository is focused and contains only the exploit module file.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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