A vulnerability exists in the U3D implementation of Adobe Reader and Acrobat (versions 9.x before 9.3, 8.x before 8.2, and 7.x before 7.1.4) on Windows and Mac OS X. The flaw is due to an array boundary issue in the handling of CLODProgressiveMeshDeclaration structures within U3D data embedded in PDF documents. This can be exploited by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by enticing a user to open a specially crafted PDF file.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (adobe_u3d_meshdecl.rb) that exploits an array overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-3953) in Adobe Reader and Acrobat for Windows (versions prior to 7.1.4, 8.2, and 9.3). The exploit works by generating a specially crafted PDF file (default name: msf.pdf) containing malformed U3D data and embedded JavaScript. When a vulnerable version of Adobe Reader/Acrobat opens the file, a heap spray is performed via JavaScript, and the U3D stream triggers the overflow, allowing arbitrary code execution. The module supports customizable Metasploit payloads, enabling the attacker to execute code of their choice (such as a reverse shell or Meterpreter session) on the target system. The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and allows for easy payload customization. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the malicious PDF file itself, which must be delivered to the victim. The code is well-structured and includes detailed comments about the heap manipulation techniques used to achieve reliable exploitation.
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