A vulnerability in the _rtld function of the Run-Time Link-Editor (rtld) in FreeBSD 7.1, 7.2, and 8.0 fails to clear the LD_PRELOAD environment variable when executing setuid or setgid binaries. This allows a local attacker to specify a malicious shared library via LD_PRELOAD, which is then loaded with elevated privileges, leading to privilege escalation. The issue is due to improper sanitization of environment variables in the dynamic linker.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/freebsd/local/rtld_execl_priv_esc.rb) that exploits a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the FreeBSD run-time link-editor (rtld), specifically due to improper handling of LD_* environment variables in the unsetenv() function (CVE-2009-4146, CVE-2009-4147). The exploit targets FreeBSD 7.2-RELEASE and 8.0-RELEASE (amd64) and requires access to a writable directory (default: /tmp), a setuid executable (default: /sbin/ping), and the presence of the 'cc' compiler. The module compiles and drops several C files to disk, abuses LD_PRELOAD to load a malicious shared object, and ultimately executes a payload (default: reverse TCP shell) as root. The structure is typical for a Metasploit local exploit, with Ruby code orchestrating the attack and generating/compiling C payloads on the fly. The main fingerprintable endpoints are the default SUID binary (/sbin/ping) and the writable directory (/tmp).
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.