A dangling pointer vulnerability exists in the mod_isapi module of Apache HTTP Server versions 2.0.37 through 2.0.63, 2.2.0 through 2.2.14, and 2.3.x before 2.3.7, when running on Windows. The flaw occurs because the server does not ensure that request processing is complete before unloading an ISAPI .dll module, leaving orphaned callback pointers. An attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted request and a reset packet, causing the ISAPI module to be unloaded while function pointers remain accessible, leading to remote code execution with SYSTEM privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/dos/http/apache_mod_isapi.rb) that exploits a use-after-free vulnerability (CVE-2010-0425) in the Apache HTTP Server's mod_isapi extension (versions 2.2.14 and earlier) on Windows. The exploit works by sending crafted HTTP POST requests to an ISAPI DLL endpoint, first causing the ISAPI module to be unloaded and then triggering a stale pointer dereference, resulting in a crash of the Apache process (denial of service). The module requires the attacker to specify the target host and the URI of an accessible ISAPI DLL (default: /cgi-bin/SMTPSend.dll). While arbitrary code execution is theoretically possible, this module only demonstrates denial of service. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit Framework.
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1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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