A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Orbital Viewer 1.04. The vulnerability is triggered when a user opens a specially crafted .orb or .ov file, which causes a buffer overflow on the stack, potentially allowing execution of arbitrary code.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2010-0688) in David Manthey's Orbital Viewer 1.04 for Windows. The exploit works by generating a malicious .ORB file that, when opened by the victim in the vulnerable application, triggers a buffer overflow due to lack of bounds checking in the fscanf function. The module allows the attacker to embed a customizable Metasploit payload (up to 2048 bytes, avoiding certain bad characters) into the file. The exploit is operational and requires social engineering to convince a user to open the crafted file. The only endpoints involved are the .ORB file format and the default output file 'msf.orb'. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit file format exploit module.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.