Maple up to and including version 13 contains unsafe behavior in its Maplet framework whereby embedded commands in a .maplet file are executed automatically when the file is opened. This bypasses the normal security restrictions applied to standard Maple worksheets that would otherwise limit or prevent code execution. An attacker can craft a malicious .maplet file so that opening it triggers execution of attacker-controlled commands.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (maple_maplet.rb) that exploits a vulnerability in Maplesoft Maple (up to version 13) on Windows and Linux. The exploit leverages Maple's Maplet file format, which allows embedded commands to be executed automatically when a .maplet file is opened. The module generates a malicious .maplet file containing a payload (either as an executable or a command), which is written to disk and executed when the victim opens the file in Maple. The exploit supports multiple platforms (Windows x86/x64, Linux x86/x64, and generic command execution) and allows the attacker to specify a template file to append the malicious content to. The main attack vector is local, requiring user interaction (the victim must open the malicious file). The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports customizable payloads. The only fingerprintable endpoints are the generated .maplet file and any optional template file used.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.