CVE-2010-2550 is a critical vulnerability in the SMB Server component of Microsoft Windows (2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008, 7, and 2008R2). The flaw is triggered by a specially crafted SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2 request with a zero-length buffer (Max DataCount set to 0), which leads to improper validation and results in kernel pool corruption due to a zero-size pool allocation in the Windows kernel. This can be exploited remotely and unauthenticated, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash). The root cause is a lack of length sanity check in NtQueryVolumeInformationFile.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting a denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2010-2550) in Microsoft Windows SMB service (SRV.SYS). The exploit is implemented in Ruby and is structured as a Metasploit module under 'modules/auxiliary/dos/windows/smb/'. The module requires access to a readable SMB share on the target system, which typically requires authentication unless a guest-accessible share is present. The exploit works by sending a specially crafted SMB trans2 request to TCP port 445, causing a pool overflow in the SRV.SYS driver and resulting in a system crash (blue screen of death). The module does not provide code execution or privilege escalation, only denial of service. The code is operational as a proof-of-concept and is intended for use within the Metasploit framework.
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