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uTorrent 2.0.3 and earlier are vulnerable to a DLL hijacking (untrusted search path) issue. When opening .torrent or .btsearch files, the application may load DLLs such as plugin_dll.dll, userenv.dll, shfolder.dll, dnsapi.dll, dwmapi.dll, iphlpapi.dll, dhcpcsvc.dll, dhcpcsvc6.dll, or rpcrtremote.dll from the same directory as the file, rather than from trusted system locations. This allows an attacker to place a malicious DLL in the same directory as a .torrent or .btsearch file, which will be loaded and executed by uTorrent.
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No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 2 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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