CVE-2010-3654 is a memory corruption vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player before 9.0.289.0 and 10.x before 10.1.102.64 on Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, and Solaris, and before 10.1.95.1 on Android. The issue also affects authplay.dll in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x through 9.4, including the corresponding AuthPlayLib.bundle/libauthplay.so components. A remote attacker can trigger the flaw by supplying crafted SWF content, including SWF embedded in web pages, PDF files, Microsoft Office documents, or other containers that render Flash content. Successful exploitation can corrupt memory and lead to arbitrary code execution or application crash. The vulnerability was reported as exploited in the wild in October 2010.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (adobe_flashplayer_button.rb) that exploits CVE-2010-3654, a remote code execution vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player (versions 9.x and 10.0) and applications embedding Flash, such as Adobe Reader and Acrobat. The exploit works by generating a malicious PDF file ('msf.pdf') containing a specially crafted SWF file ('CVE-2010-3654.swf') and JavaScript for heap spraying. When a vulnerable target opens the PDF, the embedded Flash content triggers the vulnerability, allowing arbitrary code execution via a ret2lib technique to bypass DEP. The module allows the attacker to specify a Metasploit payload, which is encoded and delivered to the target. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, with clear separation of SWF creation, JavaScript heap spray, and PDF generation logic. No network endpoints are present; the attack vector is file-based, requiring user interaction to open the malicious PDF.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.