CVE-2011-10011 affects WeBid 1.0.2. The vulnerability is in the converter.php script, which fails to sanitize attacker-controlled input supplied in the to parameter of a POST request. That input is written directly into includes/currencies.php, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary PHP code into a server-side application file. Because the injected code is stored in a PHP file that is later accessed or included by the application, exploitation results in persistent remote code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/webid_converter.rb) targeting a remote code execution vulnerability in WeBid version 1.0.2 (CVE-2011-10011). The exploit abuses the converter.php endpoint to inject arbitrary PHP code into includes/currencies.php without authentication. The module first checks for the presence and version of WeBid by accessing /WeBid/docs/changes.txt and /WeBid/converter.php. The main exploit sends a crafted POST request to /WeBid/converter.php, injecting the payload, and then triggers code execution by accessing /WeBid/includes/currencies.php. If a Meterpreter payload is used, the module can also attempt to clean up by restoring the original currencies.php file. The exploit is operational, allowing for arbitrary PHP code execution on the target server. The only file in the repository is a Ruby script compatible with the Metasploit framework.
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